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"Few issues have engendered more friction in the international
community than the extension of the United States legal system beyond
its borders during pretrial discovery." 1 This conclusion was reached by
the American Law Institute in 1985, thirteen years after the United
States ratified an international treaty created to achieve uniformity and
predictability in transnational efforts to obtain evidence,2 the Conven-
tion on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters
(Hague Evidence Convention or Convention).3 In the early 1980s, fed-
eral and state courts were required for the first time to define the role
of the Hague Evidence Convention in suits brought in the United
States. Since that time, no court in the United States has accepted the
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1 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-
VISED) § 437, reporter's note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
2 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847
U.N.T.S. 241 (preamble) [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention or Convention].
3 Id.
" "Although the Hague Evidence Convention has been in force in the United
States for over a decade, it was not until the early 1980s, at which point a significant
number of other States had ratified the Convention, that it became a major factor in
transnational litigation brought in United States courts." Comment, Extraterritorial
Discovery Under the Hague Evidence Convention, 31 VILL. L. REV. 253, 255 (1986).
France became a party to the Convention in 1974, the United Kingdom in 1978, and
the Federal Republic of Germany in 1979. For a list of signatory nations, see infra
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argument that the Convention provides the exclusive means of ob-
taining evidence located in the territory of a foreign signatory,5 a posi-
tion consistently adhered to by other signatories to the Convention. In-
stead, the majority6 of federal and state courts have held that the
Convention's procedures were either optional' or inapplicable' to the
particular discovery sought.
In June 1986, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court,9 a case calling for an interpretation of the relationship between
the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Commentators anticipated that the Court would either hold that
the Convention provides exclusive procedures for the taking of evidence
in the territory of a foreign signatory or provide an articulated legal
analysis for choosing between the Convention and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."0
The Court announced its decision in Societe Nationale Indus-
trielle Aerospatiale on June 15, 1987.1 In one respect, the decision
note 67.
5 See, e.g., Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct.,
788 F.2d 1408, 1410 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated, 823 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1987); In re
Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH, 757 F.2d 729, 731 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
granted judg. vacated sub nom. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH v. Walker, 107
S. Ct. 3223 (1987); In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. granted judg. vacated sub nom. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River
Bridge Auth., 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987).
' A minority of courts have held that parties must first resort to Convention pro-
cedures before seeking discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinaf-
ter F.R.C.P.]. General Elec. Co. v. North Star Int'l, Inc., 39 Fed. R. Serv.2d (Calla-
ghan) 207 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100
F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Nat'l Airlines, 39 Fed. R.
Serv.2d (Callaghan) 211 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Pierburg, GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior
Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982); Volkswagenwerk A.G. v.
Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Vincent v. Ateliers
de la Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 475 A.2d 686 (1984); TH. Goldschmidt
A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App. 1984).
' See, e.g., Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987); In re Messerschmitt Bolkow
Blohm, GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted judg. vacated sub. nom.
Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH v. Walker, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987); Slauenwhite
v. Bekum Maschinenfabriken, GmbH, 104 F.R.D. 616 (D. Mass. 1985); Graco, Inc. v.
Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Mas-
chinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984); Lasky v. Continental Prod. Corp., 569 F.
Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
8 In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United
States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct., 2542 (1987).
9 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986).
10 See, e.g., Rogers, On the Exclusivity of the Hague Evidence Convention, 21
TEx. INT'L L.J. 441, 467 (1986).




fulfilled the anticipation of observers; the Court held that the Hague
Evidence Convention does not provide the exclusive means of discovery
for evidence located in the territory of a foreign signatory."2 In another
respect, however, the opinion was disappointing; while the Court spoke
in general terms to the choice-of-law analysis that is appropriate in
choosing between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague
Evidence Convention,"3 it declined to "articulate specific rules to guide
this delicate task of adjudication."
14
This Article offers a useful framework through which practition-
ers and judges can determine, first, when the need for a choice between
the Federal Rules and the Hague Evidence Convention is presented,
and, second, how that choice should be approached. We believe that
this analytical model will define the role of the Hague Evidence Con-
vention more clearly and will advance the "overriding interest in the
'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination' of litigation" in federal
courts.15
2. BACKGROUND
The United States was relatively late both in appreciating the ad-
vantages of international judicial assistance and in seeking international
agreements to obtain those advantages. Decades before the United
States recognized the benefits of cooperating in judicial matters, civil
law nations" had sought bilateral agreements17 to promote interna-
tional assistance in a wide range of judicial functions. Until the late
1950s, the United States rejected both domestic and foreign efforts to
establish cooperative agreements.18
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, as the post-war domestic and
international economy of the United States improved dramatically, both
private attorneys and the United States Government discovered the
12 Id. at 2553.
13 Id. at 2557.
14 Id. (footnote omitted).
11 Id. at 2555 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
16 Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program
for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953). Jones notes, "[civil law] countries . . . have
covered the globe with a network of treaties to assure judicial assistance among 'civil-
ian' courts, a fact which may interest common law practitioners who suppose that the
common law system is more interested in fact-finding than is the civilian system." Id.
at 516.
17 For an extensive listing of such agreements, see Harvard Draft on Judicial
Assistance, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp. 1939) at 119-28.
's For an extensive discussion of American involvement in international judicial
cooperation both before and after becoming a party to the Hague Evidence Convention,
see Bishop, International Litigation in Texas: Obtaining Evidence in Foreign Coun-
tries, 19 Hous. L. REv. 361, 367-69 (1982).
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complexities of confronting foreign judicial systems." During this pe-
riod, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided two broad devices
for seeking evidence abroad: depositions and letters rogatory.20 Deposi-
tions could be taken abroad in three ways: "on notice,"21 "by commis-
sion,' '1 2 and "by stipulation."2  Each of these deposition methods was
accomplished without the participation of a foreign court. Letters roga-
tory, however, required the involvement of a foreign court, asked by a
United States court to take evidence from an identified witness.24 In the
' See Jones, supra note 16, at 517-18.
20 FED. R. Crv. P. 28(b). For an excellent discussion of these procedures, see
Jones, supra note 16.
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b). This was, and remains, the simplest of the procedures
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One party serves notice on another
party that he will orally examine specified witnesses before a United States consular or
foreign service official at a specified time and place. Jones, supra note 16, at 519. See
also Comment, Obtaining Testimony Outside the United States: Problems for the Cali-
fornia Practitioner, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1237, 1238 (1978) (discussion of taking deposi-
tions abroad as a private arrangement between parties).
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b). See Jones, supra note 16, at 519. Describing the com-
mission procedure, Jones states,
a party requests the court to authorize a foreign service officer, or any
other person designated as commissioner, to take a deposition. Issued only
when 'necessary or convenient,' the court's commission will contain such
special directions governing the mode of taking the deposition as the cir-
cumstances may require. A party upon whom a notice is served to take a
deposition orally before a consul, may object and ask that a commission be
issued to examine the witness on written interrogatories, if he thinks that
the importance of the case or the nature of the expected testimony does not
justify the expense and time of oral examination.
Id. See also Comment, supra note 21, at 1238 (a commission is a document issued by
the court in the party's home country, authorizing an individual in a foreign country to
depose a witness; the rules and regulations of the country issuing the commission gov-
ern the deposition procedure).
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 29. The parties enter into a written stipulation that a deposi-
tion will be taken before any person at any time and place suitable to the parties.
Jones, supra note 16, at 519.
24 FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) continues to govern issuance of letters rogatory where
evidence is located abroad in the territory of a non-signatory to the Hague Evidence
Convention. Letters rogatory normally are executed by the foreign court as a matter of
comity. See infra note 182. The process by which letters rogatory are effectuated in-
volves the participation of both the United States court and the foreign court. The party
desiring evidence located abroad applies to the federal court for issuance of the letter.
At one time, parties were required to describe facts that made recourse to the foreign
court "necessary or convenient." This requirement was eliminated in the 1963 amend-
ments to Rule 28(b). See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. In most instances
the requesting party is required to include written interrogatories to be propounded by
the foreign court. The federal court then forwards the letter to the foreign court
through diplomatic channels. The procedure followed in the examination conducted by
the foreign court is that defined by the internal law of that nation. Jones, supra note
16, at 530. See also, Comment, supra note 21, at 1239 (noting that a letter rogatory is
different from a commission, insofar as it asks a foreign court to take the deposition of





United States, private attorneys, who were left uninvolved in the evi-
dence-gathering process, tended to view the letters rogatory process as
both slower and less effective.25 As a result, it proved to be a less desir-
able method of gathering evidence,2" and lawyers in the United States
used depositions whenever possible.27 Unfortunately, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure neither stated nor suggested that the authorized dis-
covery processes for obtaining evidence abroad were available only to
the extent that the internal law of the country in which the evidence
was sought permitted their use." The assumption by judges and law-
yers in the United States that such broad permission existed was "erro-
neous and occasionally dangerous.""
As a result of the ineffectiveness of the methods of seeking evidence
abroad under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in response to
the increasing irritation of nations where such methods were regularly
employed, the United States Congress in 1958 established"0 the Com-
mission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial
Procedure (The Rules Commission or The Commission). 1 The Com-
mission was charged with making discovery methods in state and fed-
eral courts involved in litigation involving a foreign party or witness
"more readily ascertainable, efficient, economical and expeditious." 2 In
response to The Commission's efforts, the United States Supreme
Court amended the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1963 with re-
spect to service of process and taking of evidence abroad. 3 The next
year, Congress passed legislation improving federal judicial procedures
for service of process and discovery abroad. ' This legislation also cre-
ated more liberal methods by which foreign parties and tribunals were
2 Jones, supra note 16, at 529-31.
26 For a detailed discussion of the procedural problems encountered in the execu-
tion of American letters rogatory in foreign courts, see id. at 530-32.
2:7 Id. at 519.
28 Id. at 519; Note, Gathering Evidence Abroad: The Hague Evidence Conven-
tion Revisited, 16 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 963, 966 (1984).
29 Note, supra note 28, at 966; see Jones, supra note 16, at 521.
For an explanation of the rationale underlying the creation of The Commission
and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure [hereinafter The
Rules Commission], see S. REP. No. 2392, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958), reprinted in
1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5201-12; H.R. REP. No. 1283, 85th Cong.
2d Sess. 3 (1958).
21 Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 1, 72 Stat. 1743 (1958).
32 Id., § 2, 72 Stat. 1743.
"2 The new rules took effect on July 1, 1963. 374 U.S. 873, 883 (1963). For
useful discussion of the changes in these rules as they affected the taking of evidence,
see 4 J. MOORE, J. LuCAS & G. GROTHEER, JR., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (1)
28.01 (2d ed. 1987).
"' Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 8(a), 78 Stat. 996 (1964) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1982)).
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able to obtain evidence located in the United States. 5
The United States effort to make international evidence-taking
more effective did not lead to reciprocal cooperation by other govern-
ments."' Many nations continued to view United States discovery prac-
tices in foreign nations with hostility and as a violation of their judicial
sovereignty. 7 Many responded to such practices either indirectly, by
refusing to compel persons within their territory to comply with United
States discovery requests, or directly, by either prohibiting United
States counsel from obtaining evidence within their territory or forbid-
ding persons from complying with United States discovery efforts. 8 A
few nations, concerned with the expanding reach of United States sub-
stantive and procedural laws, prohibited persons within their jurisdic-
tion from providing any assistance to foreign litigants seeking to obtain
certain types of business documents.3
The problems caused by United States discovery practices arose
primarily out of fundamental differences between the roles played by
*5 The United States Department of State is authorized to receive, transmit and
return letters rogatory between the United States and foreign courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1781
(1982). Assistance is also given to foreign courts and litigants seeking a wide range of
evidence in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982). Mr. Phillip Amram, the chief
delegate to the Hague Conference during the negotiation of the Hague Evidence Con-
vention, described these Congressional efforts as intended
to offer to foreign countries and litigants, without a requirement of reci-
procity, wide judicial assistance on a unilateral basis for the obtaining of
evidence in the United States. The amendments. . . authorized the use in
the federal courts of evidence taken abroad in civil law countries, even if
its form did not comply with the conventional formalities of our normal
rules of evidence.
Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A. J.
651, 651 (1969).
"6 Letter of Submittal by Secretary of State William P. Rogers to the President
Regarding The Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, S. EXEc. A., 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted at 12 I.L.M. 324 (1973);
see also, Amram, supra note 35, at 655 (author noting that liberal evidence-taking
procedures for foreign litigants in the United States have not been reciprocated).
37 Report of United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference
on Private International Law, 8 I.L.M. 785, 806 (1969) [hereinafter Delegation
Report].
" For illustrative examples of the experience of private attorneys confronted with
such foreign governmental opposition to discovery practices within their territory, see
Bishop, supra note 18, at 361-63; Jones, supra note 16, at 520.
"' See, e.g., Business Records Protection Act, ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 54
(1947)(Can.) Law No. 68-678 of July 26, 1968, Relating to the Transmission of Doc-
uments and Information to Foreign Authorities in the Area of Maritime Trade, 1968
Journal Officiel de la R~publique Frangaise [J.O.] 7267, 1968 Bulletin lgislatif Dal-
loz [B.L.D.] 438 (Fr.); Shipping Contracts & Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87
(Gr. Brit.); Act of June 16, 1967, No. 3, Norges Lover [N.L.] 1726 (Nor.); Federal





the court in common law and civil law systems.' Put simply, many of
the routine discovery procedures authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, particularly the taking of depositions, would take
place exclusively in the courtroom in civil law countries.41 In contrast
to United States practices, civil law countries generally require that the
court, and not the parties, gather the evidence for trial.4 Although most
civil law countries allow attorneys to suggest questions to be asked of a
witness, the court, rather than counsel, questions the witnesses.43 Not
only is the Anglo-American practice of taking testimony of a private lay
person virtually unknown,4 4 in many civil law countries it is also con-
sidered improper or unlawful for the lawyer to talk to witnesses before
the witnesses testify in civil law trials.45 Furthermore, the witness is
normally not under oath while testifying.46 A verbatim transcript is not
kept; the judge summarizes the witness's testimony in a written narra-
tive that the witness is asked to sign.'7 The United States concept of
discovery of material that is not admissible at trial but that may lead to
admissible material is unknown in civil law systems.'8
40 For a general discussion of these differences, see Delegation Report, supra note
37, at 806. For a discussion of evidence-gathering procedures in specific civil law coun-
tries, see Borel & Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in
France for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 35 (1979); Sheman-
ski, Obtaining Evidence in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Impact of the
Hague Evidence Convention on German-American Judicial Cooperation, 17 INT'L
LAW. 465 (1983); Note, Hague Evidence Convention: A Practical Guide to the Con-
vention, United States Case Law, Convention-Sponsored Review Commissions (1978
and 1985), and Responses of Other Signatory Nations: With Digest of Cases and
Bibliography, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 73 (1986) (defining procedures in the
Federal Republic of Germany).
41 Jones, supra note 16, at 527.
42 See, Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 55 (D.D.C. 1985); Compagnie Francaise
D'Assurance Pour Le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16,
26 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co., 102 F.R.D. 956, 958
(E.D. Pa. 1984); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58,
59-60 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
'3 R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 407-08 (4th ed. 1980); Bishop, supra
note 18, at 363; Jones, supra note 16, at 527-28. See also, Work, 106 F.R.D. at 55 (in
Germany, judge determined which witnesses may testify and what questions were to be
asked); Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 59 (in civil law countries, the judge ques-
tions the witnesses and then summarizes the testimony for the record; the litigants may
not question the witnesses, but they may offer suggested questions to the judge).
", Doyle, Taking Evidence by Deposition and Letters Rogatory and Obtaining
Documents in Foreign Territory, 1959 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L & COMP. L. REP. 37, 48;
Jones, supra note 16, at 527-28.
" Jones, supra note 16, at 531.
46 Id.
47 Id.
41 Collins, The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery: A Serious Misunder-
standing?, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 765, 768 (1986) [hereinafter Collins, A Serious
Misunderstanding].
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The most significant difference between common law and civil law
approaches to evidence-gathering, however, is the fact that in civil law
nations litigation is not bifurcated between pretrial procedures and the
trial itself; instead, every proceeding after the institution of the suit is
part of the trial.49 The fact that civil law systems viewed depositions
and other discovery efforts as an essential part of the trial itself led civil
law countries to interpret United States discovery efforts as private tri-
als.50 Furthermore, these attempts at discovery were viewed as being
hostile to judicial sovereignty, because the taking of evidence in civil
law countries is essentially a sovereign function.51 Although it may be
delegated by the sovereign, the right to obtain evidence may not be uni-
laterally arrogated by foreign private attorneys or courts.52
Tension generated by American discovery practices was not lim-
ited to civil law nations. Similar hostility arose as a result of discovery
efforts in the United Kingdom. Although the modern British and
United States legal systems share many common features,53 important
differences exist between the two with respect to pretrial discovery."
'9 R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 43, at 398; Bishop, supra note 18, at 363; Jones,
supra note 16, at 528.
50 Maier, Extraterritorial Discovery: Cooperation, Coercion and the Hague Evi-
dence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAr'L L. 239 (1986). Professor Maier notes
that, in a civil law country,
the evidence gathering is characterized as a governmental act, not solely
because the judge carries it out in his official capacity but because, in
discharging this duty, he effectuates both the public policies of fairness and
efficiency embodied in the procedural mechanisms which enable the trial
and the societal interests reflected in the relevant substantive legal rules
promulgated by the legislature.
Id. at 243; see also, Delegation Report, supra note 37, at 806; Acomb, Foreign Deposi-
tions: The Problems, Pitfalls and Procedures, 14 FORUM 440, 445 (1979); Carter,
Obtaining Foreign Discovery and Evidence for Use in Litigation in the United States:
Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 INT'L LAW. 5, 7 (1979); Edwards, Taking Evi-
dence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 18 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 646, 647
(1969); Jones, supra note 16, at 528.
51 The term "sovereign function" relates to the inherent power of a government to
prescribe laws and regulate activities within its territory. See, e.g., The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
5 Jones, supra note 16, at 527. "In countries where the performance of a 'judicial
act' is historically a monopoly of the courts, taking of testimony other than by a court
pursuant to a letter of request may be treated as an infringement of sovereignty and
may even be criminal in nature." Amram, United States Ratification of the Hague
Convention On the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 107 (1973).
11 Collins, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in England
for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 27 (1979) [hereinafter Col-
lins, Obtaining Evidence in England].
"' For an extensive discussion of British discovery practices, see Myrick & Love,
Obtaining Evidence Abroad for Use In United States Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 585, 597-
609; Collins, A Serious Misunderstanding, supra note 48; Collins, Obtaining Evi-




Like civil law systems, British and most Commonwealth systems do not
permit discovery of inadmissible evidence that may lead to potentially
admissible evidence. 55 Instead, discovery is limited to the production of
documents.5" Furthermore, British and most Commonwealth systems
do not permit discovery against a person who is not a party to the
litigation.57
When unilateral actions proved ineffective, the United States took
the initiative before the Hague Conference on Private International
Law (Hague Conference or Conference)5" in proposing that a conven-
tion on international evidence-taking be considered at the 1968 meeting
of the Conference.5" Twenty-five nations participated in the negotia-
tions"0 and by 1980 the Hague Evidence Convention was opened for
signature. When President Nixon sent the Hague Evidence Convention
to the Senate for ratification, he stated that it would "permit our courts
and litigants to avail themselves of a number of improved and simpli-
fied procedures for the taking of evidence."61 The Senate, without dis-
sent, gave its consent on June 13, 1972.6"
3. OBTAINING EVIDENCE: THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
3.1. Introduction
The Hague Evidence Convention6" was designed to provide meth-
ods of taking evidence that would, in the words of the Convention's
drafters, "be 'tolerable' to the authorities of the State where it is taken
tices, see Myrick & Love, supra, at 609-13; Comment, Judicial Cooperation in the
Taking of Evidence Abroad-The Canada and Ontario Evidence Acts, 8 TEx. INT'L
L. J. 57, 69 (1973).
5 Comment, supra note 54, at 69.
Myrick & Love, supra note 54, at 598; Collins, A Serious Misunderstanding,
supra note 48, at 768.
5 Myrick & Love, supra note 54, at 598.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law [hereinafter Hague Con-
ference or Conference] is an association, currently composed of twenty-nine nations,
that has as its purpose the achievement of the progressive unification of private interna-
tional rules through multilateral treaties. The United States joined the Conference in
1964. Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,formulated Oct.
9-13, 1951, 15 U.S.T. 2228, T.I.A.S. No. 5710, 220 U.N.T.S. 121.
5, Statement of Carl F. Salans, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, Con-
vention on Taking of Evidence Abroad, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 25, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1972).
60 Delegation Report, supra note 37.
• Message From the President Transmitting the Evidence Convention, S. ExEc.
A., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. III (1972).
*" S. Res. 205, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 20,623 (1972). The United
States was one of the first nations to become party to the Hague Evidence Convention.
"s Convention, supra note 2.
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and at the same time 'utilizable' in the forum where the action will be
tried." The scope of its application is limited to civil and commercial
matters6 5 for pending or contemplated judicial proceedings. 6 To date,
nineteen nations6 7 are signatories to the Convention.
The Hague Evidence Convention establishes three methods by
which evidence may be obtained in the territory of a signatory: by a
diplomatic officer or consular agent,68 by a private commissioner, 9 and
through letters of request.7 0 Because many signatories have restricted
the use of the first two methods,71 the primary method of obtaining
evidence abroad is by the letter of request procedure.
3.2. Letters of Request
Through a letter of request, 2 a court of a signatory asks that a
" Delegation Report, supra note 37, at 806; see Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2549 (1987).
6 Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
66 Id.
67 The contracting nations are: Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom (in-
cluding Northern Ireland and the possessions of Hong Kong, Gibraltar, areas of Akro-
tiri and Dhekelia in the Island of Cyprus, and the Falkland Islands), and the United
States (including Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781
(West Supp. 1987); VIII MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, pt. 7, at 15
(1987). Spain deposited its ratification of the Convention on May 22, 1987. See OFFICE
OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
Treaties: Current Affairs, Dep't of State Bulletin 87 (Aug. 1987). Argentina deposited
its accession to the Covention on May 8, 1987. Id.
" Convention, supra note 2, arts. 15-16, 14 U.S.T. at 2564, 47 U.N.T.S. at 244.
See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
6 Convention, supra note 2, art. 17, 14 U.S.T. at 2565, 847 U.N.T.S. at 244. See
infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
7' Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1-14, 14 U.S.T. at 2557, 847 U.N.T.S. at 241.
' See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text and note 130 and accompanying
text.
72 In its basic form, the letter of request procedure is similar to the letters rogatory
procedure. Compare infra notes 73-97 and accompanying text (discussing letters of
request) with infra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing letters rogatory).
Problems with the latter procedure provided part of the motivation for the United
States to seek negotiation of what ultimately became the Hague Evidence Convention:
During the negotiations of the Evidence Convention, the United States
identified several difficulties with the traditional letter of request proce-
dure: (1) delays brought about by routing letters of request through diplo-
matic mail, (2) unnecessary translation requirements, (3) unavailability of
verbatim transcripts, and (4) other procedural requirements of the re-
questing state. Because of the expense and delay involved in using letters
of request, the United States sought to improve the letter of request tech-
nique and to authorize 'less burdensome means' of obtaining testimony
from a witness in a foreign state.




court of another signatory obtain specific evidence for use in judicial
proceedings within the former's territory. The request is communicated
to a "central authority" in the receiving state." The function of the
central authority is to receive the letters of request from foreign author-
ities and to transmit them to the appropriate tribunals within the exe-
cuting state."' This process is intended to eliminate uncertainty as to
the proper recipient of letters of request. 5 If a letter of request is sent
to the wrong entity in the executing state, Article 6 of the Convention
requires that the letter be forwarded to the correct authority."
Article 3 of the Convention specifies the content of a letter of re-
quest. In particular, Article 3 requires that a letter of request
identify:7
(1) the authority issuing the letter and the authority request-
ing its execution if known;"8
(2) the names and addresses of the parties to the suit and
their representatives;79
(3) the nature of the proceedings;"
(4) the evidence sought to be obtained or the other judicial
act to be performed;"'
(5) the names and addresses of the witnesses;8 2
(6) the specific questions to be asked or a statement of the
subject matter about which the witness is to be examined; 8
(7) the documents or property to be inspected;
14
(8) a statement that the evidence is to be given under oath or
affirmation, if applicable, and any special form of oath or
affirmation required; 5 and
of Evidence Abroad, with Annexes, IV Conference de la Haye de droit international
priv6, AcTEs ET DOCUMENTS DE LA ONZIEME SESSION 9, 27-28 (1968)).
11 Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1, 2, 23 U.S.T. at 2557-58, 847 U.N.T.S. at
241. The designated central authority and other competent authorities named by a con-
tracting nation for the receipt of letters of request are normally identified in the na-
tion's declaration. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1987). The Department of
Justice has been designated as the central authority for the United States. Id.
7" Convention, supra note 2, art. 2, 23 U.S.T. at 2560, 847 U.N.T.S. at 242.
71 Delegation Report, supra note 37, at 809.
78 Convention, supra note 2, art. 6, 23 U.S.T. at 2560, 847 U.N.T.S. at 242.
77 The requirements of Article 3 are modeled on the United Kingdom's bilateral
treaties of judicial assistance. See Delegation Report, supra note 37, at 809.
71 Convention, supra note 2, art. 3(a), 23 U.S.T. at 2558, 847 U.N.T.S. at 241.
79 Id., art. 3(b).
SO Id., art. 3(c).
s Id., art. 3(d), 23 U.S.T. at 2558, 847 U.N.T.S. at 242.
82 Id., art. 3(e).
83 Id., art. 3(f).
I" Id., art. 3(g).
85 Id., art. 3(h), 23 U.S.T. at 2359, 847 U.N.T.S. at 242.
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(9) any special method or procedure to be followed in ob-
taining the evidence.86
The Convention allows letters of request to be written in either
English or French."7 A signatory may, however, refuse to accept letters
in either language, pursuant to its power of reservation under Article
33.8 If a signatory makes an Article 33 declaration, a letter of request
sent to its central authority must be either written in, or accompanied
by a translation into, an acceptable language specified by the signa-
tory.89 A translation is not recognized unless it is certified as correct by
a diplomatic officer, a consular agent, a sworn translator, or any other
person authorized by either the requesting or receiving state.90
Prior to the actual execution of a letter of request, a requesting
state has the right to "be informed of the time when, and the place
where, the proceedings will take place, in order that the parties con-
cerned, and their representatives may be present."91 The executing
state may also allow members of the requesting judicial authority to
attend the execution of the letter.92
Article 10 of the Convention requires the executing country to use
whatever means of compulsion are available under its law for domestic
proceedings to obtain the requested evidence.9" While the executing sig-
natory will normally employ its own evidence-gathering procedures, the
Convention requires that it proceed in accordance with any special
method or procedure requested by the requesting signatory, 9" unless the
requested method of procedure is: (1) incompatible with its domestic
law,95 or (2) impossible due to either practical difficulties or the inter-
86 Id., arts. 3(i) & 9, 23 U.S.T. at 2561, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243. For a model letter
of request, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1987). A similar copy of a model letter
of request may be obtained from the Office of Foreign Litigation of the United States
Department of Justice.
87 Convention, supra note 2, art. 4, 23 U.S.T. at 2559, 847 U.N.T.S. at 242.
Id., art. 33, 23 U.S.T. at 2571, 847 U.N.T.S. at 247.
89 Id., art. 4, 23 U.S.T. at 2559, 847 U.N.T.S. at 242.
9o Id. American consular officers are not authorized to translate documents or to
certify the correctness of translations. 22 C.F.R. § 92.78 (1987).
91 Convention, supra note 2, art. 7, 23 U.S.T. at 2560-61, 847 U.N.T.S. 242.
92 Id., art. 8, 23 U.S.T. at 2561, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243.
93 Id., art. 10, 23 U.S.T. at 2561-62, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243.
" This section allows a court in the United States, for example, to request that
testimony be taken under oath or that a verbatim transcript be kept. Delegation Report,
supra note 37, at 810, 813.
91 Convention, supra note 2, arts. 9 & 12, 23 U.S.T. at 2561, 2562-63, 847
U.N.T.S. at 243. Amram has commented, "[tihe Report of the Rapporteur of the Con-
vention notes that the word 'incompatible' does not mean 'different' from the domestic
law; it means that a constitutional or statutory barrier in the domestic law prevents





nal practice or procedure of the executing state.9" The Convention ap-
plies the standard of "impossibility," rather than a standard of "diffi-
culty" or "inconvenience," in order to reduce the possibility of refusal
by an executing state.9"
Under the Convention, a letter of request may be refused if: (1) it
was issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of docu-
ments;98 (2) it fails to comply with the formal requirements of the Con-
vention;99 or (3) its execution would prejudice the sovereignty or secur-
ity of the acting state.100 Among these grounds, the "pretrial discovery"
ground for refusal has been the major source of controversy among the
contracting states. 101
Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Convention provides, "[a] Con-
tracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession,
declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the pur-
pose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Com-
mon Law countries."'0 2 This article was included in the Convention at
the insistence of the United Kingdom 03 and was intended to allow the
rejection of the kind of "fishing expeditions" permitted by United
States discovery rules.'04 All of the Article 23 declarations made prior
,6 Convention, supra note 2, art. 9, 23 U.S.T. at 2561, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243.
"Amram, supra note 35, at 106 n.14.
BB Convention, supra note 2, art. 23, 23 U.S.T. at 2362-63, 847 U.N.T.S. 245;
see infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
' Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, 23 U.S.T. at 2568, 847 U.N.T.S. at 242.
100 Id., art. 12, 23 U.S.T. at 2562-63, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243. This exception has
never been invoked as a reason for the refusal to execute a letter of request under the
Convention. Heck, U.S. Misinterpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 231, 266 (1986). See Note, supra note 28, at 979 n.98
(citing Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Falzon, 464 U.S. 811 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465
U.S. 1014 (1984)).
101 Report of the United States Delegation to the Special Commission on the Op-
eration of the Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters (June 12-15, 1978) reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1417, 1421
(1978) [hereinafter U.S. Delegation Report].
102 Convention, supra note 2, art. 23, 23 U.S.T. at 2568, 847 U.N.T.S. at 245.
103 The British attitude toward broad and unspecified pretrial discovery requests
is reflected in a case decided a dozen years before the Convention was drafted. In Radio
Corp. of Am. v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618 (C.A.), defendants in a patent
infringement suit sought evidence from British non-party witnesses. The court denied
the request as to disclosure of information that was not directly relevant to the issues to
be tried. As to that part of the request, the court said, "[t]hat is mainly what we should
call a 'fishing' proceeding, which is never allowed in English courts. . . ." Id. at 649.
See also Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. 547
(1977).
For an excellent discussion of the legislative history and purpose of Article 23, see
Collins, A Serious Misunderstanding, supra note 48, at 775-77.
104 Report on The Work Of The Special Commission on the Operation of the
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters (June 12-15, 1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1425, 1428 (1978) [here-
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to 1978,05 except that of the United Kingdom, were blanket prohibi-
tions against pretrial discovery of documents. In 1978, at the scheduled
meeting of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Evidence
Convention, 0 ' the United States sought to clarify an apparent misun-
derstanding about the scope and function of United States pretrial dis-
covery.10 7 As a result, the other signatories agreed to reevaluate their
Article 23 declarations.
08
Presently, four signatories, Barbados, Czechoslovakia, Israel and
the United States, have not made declarations under Article 23.09
France, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Portugal and West Germany
have filed declarations precluding all pretrial discovery of documents."
inafter Special Commission Report].
.05 By 1978, every Signatory, except the United States, had made an Article 23
declaration. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1987).
"' The Hague Conference appointed the Special Commission on the Operation of
the Evidence Convention [hereinafter Special Commission], which is composed of ex-
perts on international judicial assistance and representatives of the Signatories, to meet
periodically to consider ways in which to make the Convention's procedures more effec-
tive. The 1978 meeting was a continuation of the Special Commission's first meeting in
1977. Special Commission Report, supra note 104, at 1425.
107 Those countries that had made Article 23 declarations apparently believed that
the pretrial discovery of documents in common law systems was conducted not just
prior to trial, but prior to the initiation of the litigation. U.S. Delegation Report, supra
note 101, at 1421. Believing that several of the Signatories that had made blanket dec-
larations under Article 23 had not intended to accomplish so broad a declaration, the
Special Commission expressed the desire
that the States Parties to the Convention and those which were to become
Parties withdraw or never make this reservation, or at least that they re-
strict by declaration the application of the reservation to Letters of Re-
quest which are not sufficiently specific, taking as their example the decla-
ration made by the United Kingdom.
Special Commission Report, supra note 104, at 1428. For an in-depth discussion of the
confusion regarding the nature of "pretrial" discovery, see Oxman, The Choice Between
Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the
Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733, 771-77 (1983).
108 Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore and Sweden have
modified what were initially blanket prohibitions in favor of declarations similar to
those in the British Article 23 declaration. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1987); see
infra note 112 and accompanying text.
109 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1987).
110 Id. In 1985, the Special Commission held its second meeting. As it had in its
first meeting, the Special Commission endorsed the United Kingdom's declaration as an
appropriate reservation against "unreasonable or overly burdensome" discovery re-
quests. Report on the Second Meeting of the Special Commission on the Operation of
the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commercial Matters, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1668, 1675-77 (1985).
In commenting on West Germany's Article 23 declaration, which has not been
modified, one author has noted,
[a]lthough it was initially believed that the FRG's hostility to this type of
evidence-taking was based on a misunderstanding of the concept, it now




Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore and
Sweden have made Article 23 declarations similar to that of the United
Kingdom,"'1 which is directed at broad and unspecific letters of request
that require a person:
a. to state what documents relevant to the proceedings
to which the Letter of Request relates are, or have been, in
his possession, custody, or power; or
b. to produce any documents other than particular
documents specified in the Letter of Request as being docu-
ments appearing to the requested court to be, or to be likely
to be, in his possession, custody or power.1 "
Clearly, this type of request seeks the kind of broad and unspecific
discovery that motivated the United Kingdom to insist upon including
Article 23 in the Convention.11 When seeking to obtain evidence in
these countries through the Convention's letter of request procedure, a
litigant should clearly specify the documents sought; should make the
request as narrow and specific as possible; and should ask the United
States district court to state that the evidence sought is required "solely
for use at the trial and for no other purpose and will, if obtained, be
introduced at the trial."'"
If a letter of request is refused by an executing state, Article 13
requires the executing state to notify the requesting state immediately
of the reasons for the refusal.1 5 This notification requirement is in-
tended to reduce the likelihood of arbitrary refusal.1" Article 36 of the
Convention creates procedures for diplomatic discussions in the event
ences between the two systems. Above all, the FRG is interested in pro-
tecting its citizens, including its corporate "citizens," from an information-
gathering proceeding whose scope exceeds by far that which would be per-
missible under German law. The FRG government, in its official memo-
randum published incident to the ratification of the Convention, noted that
pre-trial proceedings of an investigatory or "discovery" nature "are in
general not provided for in continental-European law, since the danger
exists that through such proceedings, economic or industrial secrets could
be disclosed."
Shemanski, supra note 40, at 480 (footnote omitted).
x 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1987).
"' Id. At least one commentator has challenged the "myth" that the United King-
dom intended this as a "limited" reservation, rather than explanatory of one part of the
content of a general reservation prohibiting all pretrial discovery of documents. Collins,
A Serious Misunderstanding, supra note 48, at 778-83.
113 See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
14 Radio Corp. of Am. v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618 (C.A.); Bishop,
supra note 18, at 386.
11 Convention, supra note 2, art. 13, 23 U.S.T. at 2563, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243.
116 Comment, supra note 4, at 267 (1986).
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the requesting state believes a letter of request was improperly
denied."
If, however, the executing state accepts the letter of request, it
must execute the letter and return the pertinent documents "to the re-
questing authority by the same channel which was used by the lat-
ter.""1 8 The executing state has the right to require the requesting state
to reimburse it for both fees paid to experts and interpreters, and costs
incurred through the use of a special procedure requested by the state
of origin under Article 9."19 "Costs occasioned by the employment of an
examiner appointed by the court can be reclaimed only if the consent
for incurring such costs has been obtained from the requesting author-
ity in advance."120 No other costs or fees are reimbursable under the
Convention. 2
3.3. Use of Diplomatic Officers, Consular Agents or Approved
Commissioners
The other two Convention procedures for the taking of evidence
abroad involve the use of diplomatic officers, consular agents, or ap-
pointed commissioners. 2 These procedures differ from the letter of re-
quest procedure in that they do not require the participation of the
courts in the foreign signatory. Attendance of witnesses at these pro-
ceedings cannot be compelled. 3 A diplomatic officer or consular agent
may take evidence from one of his own nationals in the territory in
which he performs his functions. 2 A signatory may, however, require
that prior permission be obtained in each case before allowing the of-
ficers or agents to take such testimony.' 25 Diplomatic officers and con-
sular agents may also take testimony from nationals of the host state or
a third state.'2 Prior permission is always required in these instances
"" Article 36 provides that "[a]ny difficulties which may arise between Con-
tracting States in connection with the operation of this Convention shall be settled
through diplomatic channels." Convention, supra note 2, art. 36, 23 U.S.T. at 2572,
847 U.N.T.S. at 247.
118 Id., art. 13, 23 U.S.T. at 2563, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243.
"19 Id., art. 14, 23 U.S.T. at 2563-64, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243-44.
120 Edwards, supra note 50, at 649.
121 Convention, supra note 2, art. 14, 23 U.S.T. at 2563, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243.
122 Id., arts. 15-17, 23 U.S.T. at 2564-65, 847 U.N.T.S. at 244.
123 Id.
124 Id., art. 16. American consular officers may take depositions on notice or to
execute commissions for the taking of evidence when requested to do so. 22 U.S.C. §§
4215, 4221 (1982); 22 C.F.R. § 92.55 (1986). However, they are not empowered to do
so if foreign law prohibits the action. Id. The regulations governing the taking of evi-
dence by consular officials are found at 22 C.F.R. §§ 92.49-.71 (1986).
"I Convention, supra note 2, art. 15, 23 U.S.T. at 2564, 847 U.N.T.S. at 244.




unless the executing state has declared otherwise. 127 A grant of permis-
sion may impose any conditions the host state considers to be necessary
or appropriate. 2 Representatives of the host state have a right to be
present at the actual taking of the testimony to insure that their nation-
als are not subject to undue pressure or influence by the presiding of-
ficer.129 Finally, pursuant to conditions established by the contracting
state,130 authorized commissioners may take voluntary evidence in aid
of proceedings commenced in the courts of any contracting state.' s '
3.4. Obtaining Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
The scope and nature of the procedures for obtaining evidence
under the Hague Evidence Convention differ dramatically from the dis-
covery procedures authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The authorized means of discovery of information and documents in
litigation before United States courts are found in Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 26 through 37. These methods are identified in Rule
26(a):
Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following
methods: depositions upon oral examination or written ques-
tions; written interrogatories; production of documents or
things or permission to enter upon land or other property,
for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental ex-
aminations; and requests for admission.'1
2
The scope of information that may be discovered under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is extremely broad and includes not only in-
formation that is admissible and relevant, but also information that is
not admissible but that "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
1 7 Id. The permission may be given generally or on an individual basis. The
United States has given general permission. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (1982).
128 Convention, supra note 2, art. 19, 23 U.S.T. at 2566, 847 U.N.T.S. at 245.
129 Delegation Report, supra note 37, at 816.
130 Convention, supra note 2, art. 17, 23 U.S.T. at 2565, 847 U.N.T.S. at 244.
Unlike the case as applied diplomatic officers and consular agents, the nationality of a
commissioner does not limit his authority to take evidence. Id.
131 Id.
132 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a). Depositions are governed by FED. R. Civ. P. 27 & 28;
depositions upon oral examination by FED. R. Civ. P. 30; depositions upon written
questions by FED. R. Civ. P. 31; interrogatories to parties by FED. R. Civ. P. 33;
production of documents and things and inspection of land by FED. R. Civ. P. 34;
physical and mental examinations by FED. R. Civ. P. 35; and requests for admission
by FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
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discovery of admissible evidence."' 8 Generally, the parties conduct dis-
covery without the active participation of the court, but a party may
seek the court's assistance either to compel a response to a discovery
request'34 or to protect against discovery.' 35 Except where depositions
are to be conducted abroad, a situation that is governed by rule
"I FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1). This rule provides in pertinent part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of any discoverable matter.
Id. For general background on the breadth of discovery prior to the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F. 2d 976 (2d Cir.
1942) and McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
"3 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c). This rule provides:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought,
and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or
alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district
where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, op-
pression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the fol-
lowing: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be
had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the
time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that
certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be
limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one
present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after
being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
Id. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1983 were intended to
allow greater judicial involvement, when the trial judge finds it appropriate, to avoid
"excessive discovery and evasion or resistance to reasonable discovery requests." FED.
R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee's note (1983). According to the Advisory Committee,
[t]he purpose of discovery is to provide a mechanism for making rele-
vant information to the litigants. . . . Thus the spirit of the rules are vio-
lated when advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical weapons
rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues by overuse of
discovery or unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive responses.
All of this results in excessively costly and time-consuming activities that
are disproportionate to the nature of the case, the amount involved, or the
issues or values at stake. . . . These practices impose costs on an already
overburdened system and impede the fundamental goal of the 'just, speedy,




28(b),1"' the scope and nature of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governing discovery are not altered either by the fact that one of the
parties is a foreign national, or by the fact that the information sought
to be discovered is located outside the United States.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provide for the issuance
of subpoenas that command the person to whom they are directed to
give testimony or to produce designated books, papers, documents or
other tangible things.' Rule 45(e)(2) provides, however, that "[a] sub-
poena directed to a witness in a foreign country shall issue under the
circumstances and in the manner and be served as provided in 28
U.S.C. § 1783. '"'1 Section 1783 is part of the Walsh Act,1" 9 which
empowers a United States court to order the issuance of a subpoena
requiring a United States national or resident who is in a foreign
country to appear and give testimony or produce documents or
things.'"4 The subpoena power under § 1783 is not to be used, how-
ever, unless the court finds that "it is not possible to obtain his testi-
mony in admissible form without his personal appearance or to obtain
the production of the document or other thing in any other manner."""
Although the United States has consistently taken the position that it
has the right under international law to compel its citizens residing
abroad both to give testimony in, and to produce documents for, United
States litigation,"42 a number of foreign governments believe this exer-
cise of extraterritorial compulsion violates international law."3 Several
foreign nations have enacted laws prohibiting service of subpoenas by
United States officials within their territory."'
131 FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
137 FED. R. Civ. P. 45.
"I8 FED. R. CIv. P. 45(e)(2).
139 Ch. 762, 44 Stat. 835 (1926) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1783-1784
(1982)).
140 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1982).
141 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (1982).
141 See e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 439 (1932) ("[tlhe question
of the validity of the provision for actual service of the subpoena in a foreign country is
one that arises solely between the Government of the United States and the citizen...
[and] is in no sense an invasion of any right of the foreign government."); FTC v.
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
United States v. Lansky, 496 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1974). But see infra notes 174-203
and accompanying text. It is clear, however, that a nation does not have the unilateral
right under international law to invoke its compulsory process directly against foreign
nationals within the territory of the foreign state. Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 8 comments e & f, § 20 comment b, § 44
(1965).
143 See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
1 See, e.g., SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] arts. 271-274; CODE
P&NAL SUISSE [CP] arts. 271-274, CODICE PENALE SVIZZERO [Cp] arts. 271-274; Note,
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4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
As earlier noted,14 the extension of United States discovery efforts
beyond the borders of the United States has engendered much friction
in the international community." 6 The friction created by the contin-
ued use of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure discovery techniques for
obtaining evidence in situations where foreign signatories believe the
Hague Evidence Convention provides exclusive mechanisms14 has been
The 1980 French Law on Documents and Information, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382
(1981).
The Hague Evidence Convention allows signatories to prohibit the use of compul-
sion by diplomatic officers, consular agents and commissioners to take evidence from
any person, including their own nationals, unless application is made to local authori-
ties to do so and that application is granted. See Convention, supra note 2, arts. 15-16,
23 U.S.T. at 2564-65, 847 U.N.T.S. at 244. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying
text. As one commentary on the Convention noted,
[a] conflict. . . may exist between the procedure authorized by the Walsh
Act and the Hague Evidence Convention, a ratified treaty of the United
States. An argument . . . may be made that for countries having made
such declarations, the U.S. court should not and possibly cannot order
such compulsion of testimony in such countries.
Myrick & Love, supra note 54, at 589 n.10.
145 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
146 As a result of this friction, signatories to the Hague Evidence Convention, as
well as non-signatories, passed statutes aimed at frustrating the execution of American
discovery orders. Many of'these laws were enacted as a direct response to specific ex-
traterritorial application of American laws. See Note, Compelling Production of Docu-
ments in Violation of Foreign Law: An Examination and Reevaluation of the Ameri-
can Position, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 877, 879-80 (1982). One expert on such non-
disclosure or "blocking" statutes has suggested that these laws fall into two broad cate-
gories: those that are enacted to prohibit disclosure of all evidence related to certain
subject matters, and those that "attempt to condition discovery on the American party's
compliance with foreign procedural law and international treaties." Batista, Con-
fronting Foreign Blocking Legislation: A Guide to Securing Disclosure from Non-
Resident Parties to American Litigation, 17 INr'L LAW. 61, 63-64 (1983). As exam-
ples of the first type, see Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act,
1976 Austl. Acts No. 1125, repealed by Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction)
Act, 1984 Austl. Acts No. 3; Uranium Information Security Regulations, CAN. CONS.
REGS. ch. 366 (1970), amended by Can. Gaz. 3513 (Sept. 12, 1981); South African
Atomic Energy Act of 1967, No. 3, § 30(l)(a). For an example of the second type, see
Law No. 80-538, 1980 [J.O.] 1799 art. 2 (Fr.). See infra note 253. As a result of the
enactment of foreign blocking laws, American courts have been required to decide
whether to deny the discovery request of one party, or rather to order the other party to
commit acts that violate the law of a foreign state. See, e.g., Societe Internationale Pour
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958);
FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir.
1980); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992
(10th Cir. 1977); Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d
897 (2d Cir. 1968); Application of the Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir.
1962).




exacerbated since 1980 as numerous federal and state courts have been
called upon to define the relationship between the two bodies of law.14
While a few early cases held that parties must first resort to the Con-
vention procedures and may employ the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure only when Convention procedures proved ineffective, 149 the major-
ity of courts in the United States have rejected this rule of "first
resort.11 50 Instead, they have held that the Convention merely provides
an alternative to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
1 51
On June 15, 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided So-
ciete Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
have consistently asserted that the Convention's procedures are exclusive. See e.g., Brief
for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospa-
tiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695), reprinted in 25
I.L.M. 1519 (1986); Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae,
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542
(1987) (No. 85-1695), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1539 (1986). The United Kingdom does
not view the Convention as exclusive. See Brief of the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae, Societe Nationalle In-
dustrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-
1695), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1557 (1986).
148 In virtually every case, one party had sought discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the other party had moved for a protective order under
Rule 26(c), arguing that the discovery could proceed only if undertaken through Con-
vention procedures.
' General Elec. Co. v. North Star Int'l, Inc., 39 Fed. R. Serv.2d (Callaghan)
207 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D.
58 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 39 Fed. R. Serv.2d (Cal-
laghan) 211 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Pierburg, GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Ct., 137 Cal.
App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982); Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Superior Ct., 123
Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane,
S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 475 A.2d 686 (1984); TH. Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676
S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
180 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
151 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 788 F.2d
1408 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated, 823 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1987); 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987);
In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986), va-
cated and remanded, Societe National Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist.
Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987); In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH, 757 F.2d
729 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted judg. vacated sub. nom Messerschmitt Bolkow
Blohm, GmbH v. Walker, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987); In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d
602 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted & judg. vacated sub. nom Anschuetz & Co.,
GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987); Lowrance v.
Michael Weinig, GmbH & Co., 107 F.R.D. 386 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); Slauenwhite v.
Bekum Maschinenfabriken, GmbH, 104 F.R.D. 616 (D. Mass. 1985); International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Compagnie
Francaise d'Assurance Pour le Commerce Ext~rieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105
F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am World Airways, 103
F.R.D. 42 (D.D.C. 1984); McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co., 102 F.R.D. 956
(E.D. Pa. 1984); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Mur-
phy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984); Lasky v.
Continental Prod. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Wilson v. Lufthansa
German Nat'l Airlines, 108 A.D.2d 393, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1985).
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Court,"'2 and held that the Hague Evidence Convention does not pro-
vide exclusive or mandatory procedures for obtaining documents and
information located in the territory of a foreign signatory. 5" Writing
for the majority,1 '5 Justice Stevens noted that at least four interpreta-
tions of the relationship between the Hague Convention and the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure were possible:
First, the Hague Convention might be read as requiring its
use to the exclusion of any other discovery procedures when-
ever evidence located abroad is sought for use in an Ameri-
can court. Second, the Hague Convention might be inter-
preted to require first, but not exclusive, use of its
procedures. . . . Third, . . . the Convention might be
viewed as establishing a supplemental set of discovery proce-
dures, strictly optional under treaty law, to which concerns
of comity nevertheless require first resort by American courts
in all cases. Fourth, the treaty may be viewed as an under-
taking among sovereigns to facilitate discovery to which an
American court should resort when it deems that course of
action appropriate, after considering the situations of the
parties before it as well as the interests of the concerned for-
eign state. 55
Without expressly stating its choice, the majority implicitly
adopted the fourth interpretation. In rejecting the first three interpreta-
tions, the majority noted that the language of the Convention does not
speak in mandatory terms that purport to exclude all other existing
practices.158 The Convention neither modifies the law of a signatory
152 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
153 Id. at 2553. Although the Court's decision was 5-4, all nine of the Justices
agreed on the non-exclusivity of the Convention; the majority and dissent diverged on
the appropriate approach to determining under what circumstances resort should be
had to Convention procedures in litigation before federal courts.
154 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell and Scalia joined with
Justice Stevens.
'15 107 S. Ct. at 2550.
158 Id. at 2550-53. For example, article 1 of the Convention provides that a judi-
cial authority in one contracting State "may" forward a letter of request to the compe-
tent authority in another contracting State for the purpose of obtaining evidence. Con-
vention, supra note 2, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. at 2557, 847 U.N.T.S. at 241. Similarly,
articles 15, 16, and 17 state that diplomatic officers, consular agents and commissioners,
"'may. . .[take evidence] without compulsion," under certain conditions. Id., arts. 15-
17, 23 U.S.T. at 2564-65, 847 U.N.T.S. at 244. Article 27 of the Convention expressly
authorizes that membership to the Convention does not prevent a signatory nation from
using more liberal methods of rendering evidence than those authorized by the Conven-
tion. Id., art. 27, 23 U.S.T. at 2569, 847 U.N.T.S. at 246. The majority reasoned,




nation nor requires or compels a signatory to use the procedures out-
lined in the Convention prior to resorting to the procedures of the sig-
natory's internal law.""7 Instead, the language is permissive and does
not "require first resort to Convention procedures whenever discovery
is sought from a foreign litigant."1" "
In its analysis of the fourth interpretation, the majority stated that
the trial court should resort to Convention procedures "when it deems
that course of action appropriate, after considering the situations of the
parties before it as well as the interests of the concerned foreign state
.. )... Aside from exercising "special vigilance" in evaluating the
intrusiveness and unreasonableness of the discovery request,60 the trial
court is to "demonstrate due respect for any special problem confronted
by the foreign litigant .. and for any sovereign interest expressed by
a foreign state." '161 The majority declined however to articulate rules
for the trial court "to guide this delicate task of adjudication." '
Justice Blackmun, writing for the minority, dissented in part from
the majority opinion. 6' Justice Blackmun concurred with those parts of
the majority opinion that rejected the two extreme positions regarding
the Convention: that it is either exclusive and mandatory or entirely
inapplicable.1 ' The minority dissented from the majority's case-by-case
approach and criticized its failure to provide meaningful guidance to
ratification by the United States, unambiguously supports the conclusion that it was
intended to establish optional procedures that would facilitate the taking of evidence
abroad." Aerospatiale 107 S. Ct. at 2552-53.
157 Aerospatiale 107 S. Ct. at 2555. The preamble of the Hague Evidence Con-
vention specifies its purpose "to facilitate the transmission and execution of Letters of
Request" and "to improve mutual judicial co-operation in civil or commercial mat-
ters ... " Convention, supra note 2, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 2557, 847 U.N.T.S. at
241.
18 Aerospatiale 107 S. Ct. at 2555.
15 Id. at 2550.
160 Id. at 2557.
Judicial supervision of discovery should always seek to minimize its costs
and inconvenience and to prevent improper uses of discovery requests.
When it is necessary to seek evidence abroad, however, the District Court
must supervise pretrial proceedings particularly closely to prevent discov-
ery abuses. For example, the additional cost of transportation of docu-
ments or witnesses to or from foreign locations may increase the danger
that discovery may be sought for the improper purpose of motivating set-
tlement, rather than finding relevant and probative evidence.
Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. (footnote omitted).
163 Id. at 2557 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). justices
Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor joined with Justice Blackmun.
"" Id. at 2558 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the lower courts.1 6 Justice Blackmun would not remove judicial discre-
tion entirely from the determination of the proper method of discovery
where one of the parties is a national of a foreign signatory. Instead,
the minority opinion advocated a general presumption that resort
should first be rhade to Convention procedures.16 The minority stated
that an individual analysis of a particular case would be appropriate
only after a court determines that Convention procedures would be fu-
tile or unhelpful.16
5. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF THE HAGUE Evi-
DENCE CONVENTION IN CIVIL SUITS BROUGHT IN UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS
The remainder of this Article develops a method of analysis for
determining, first, when a choice between the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Hague Evidence Convention is presented, and, sec-
ond, how the choice is to be made. Determining whether a choice be-
tween the Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exists
requires a two-step analysis. The first step asks where the contem-
plated "evidence-taking proceeding"168 will occur. If it is to be con-
ducted in the territory of a foreign signatory to the Hague Evidence
Convention, the following conclusion is appropriate: the Hague Evi-
dence Convention is the exclusive means through which the proceeding
may be conducted; the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplica-
ble, and no choice-of-law question is presented. 69 If the proceeding is
to be conducted in the United States, the party seeking discovery must
look to the second step of the proposed analysis.
The second step asks where the evidence is located. Assuming that
the evidence-taking proceeding occurs in the United States, and the lo-
cation of the evidence is in the United States, the following conclusion
is appropriate: the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the proper
means of discovering that evidence, the Hague Evidence Convention is
inapplicable, and no choice-of-law question between the two is
presented."
Only when the evidence-taking proceeding is in the United States
and the evidence is located in the territory of a foreign signatory, the




16 See infra notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
169 Id.




v. United States District Court, is a choice of law between the Conven-
tion and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure presented. Resolution of
that choice, in accordance with the broad standards articulated in Aer-
ospatiale, may be approached through a three-level analysis. The first
level examines whether the sovereign interests of the foreign signatory
in whose territory the evidence is located are accommodated through
use of the Convention's procedures.1"1 If they are not, the court should
reject any assertion that the parties be required to resort to those proce-
dures. If the foreign signatory's interests are accommodated by resort-
ing to the Convention, the second level examines whether substantial
sovereign interests of the United States are impaired by deferring to the
Hague Evidence Convention. 7 If they are, the court should allow dis-
covery to proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
third step is reached only if substantial interests of the United States
are not impaired by ordering that discovery proceed through the Con-
vention. In such a case, the court should defer to the Convention, unless
the party opposing those procedures can demonstrate that the order will
impose upon him a substantial burden that outweighs the burden im-
posed upon the other party by discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.1
73
5.1. Identifying the Situs of the Evidence-Taking Proceeding
Because identification of the situs of an evidence-taking proceeding
may lead to the conclusion that a choice between the Hague Evidence
Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not
presented, 7 4 it serves as a useful starting point of analysis. Despite the
general statement in Aerospatiale that the Hague Evidence Convention
does not provide exclusive and mandatory methods of obtaining evi-
dence abroad, 5 the weight of case authority continues to support the
conclusion that when a proceeding is to be conducted in the territory of
a foreign signatory, use of Convention procedures is mandatory and the
171 See infra notes 226-257 and accompanying text.
171 See infra notes 258-67 and accompanying text.
173 See infra notes 268-94 and accompanying text. Although the Hague Evidence
Convention does not distinguish between evidence-taking from parties to the litigation
and evidence-taking from non-parties, numerous federal courts have distinguished the
two in dicta. For this reason, we discuss the model as it applies to evidence-taking from
parties in Section 5.1 through 5.3 below. In Section 5.4, we examine evidence-taking
from non-parties and conclude that only in limited situations will non-parties be treated
differently under the proposed model.
4 See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
175 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S.
Ct. 2542, 2548 (1987).
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Federal Rules are inapplicable.17 1 United States courts clearly have dis-
"'8 This conclusion survives Aerospatiale because that case concerned only "the
extent to which a Federal District Court must employ the procedures set forth in the
Convention when litigants seek answers to interrogatories, the production of docu-
ments, and admissions. . . ." 107 S.Ct. at 2546 (emphasis added). The Magistrate's
ruling that any oral depositions to be conducted in France must comply with Conven-
tion procedures was not challenged on appeal; therefore, the Supreme Court did not
address the issue of whether depositions and on-site inspections to be conducted in the
territory of a foreign signatory must be undertaken through the means established by
the Convention. Id at 2547 n.7.
The role of the Hague Convention is treated differently where evidence abroad is
sought through depositions or inspection of premises in the territory of a foreign signa-
tory. The possibility of such divergent treatment became evident in the position taken
by the United States Government in amicus curiae briefs to the United States Supreme
Court in cases concerning the role of the Convention. The first such brief was filed in
Volkswagenwerk A.G. v: Falzon, 464 U.S. 811 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S.
1014 (1984). In Falzon, the defendant, a national of West Germany, sought Supreme
Court review of a Michigan state court order that a United States consular official take
depositions of West German nationals who were employees of defendant. The deposi-
tions, ordered pursuant to Michigan court rules, were to take place in West Germany.
The Government recommended that the Court refuse review of the case on the ground
that the Government would not allow United States consular officials to carry out the
order of the Michigan court and thus the depositions would not take place. Neverthe-
less, it articulated an unambiguous position with regard to the impropriety of an Amer-
ican court ordering a deposition to be taken in the territory of a signatory outside of
either Convention procedures or procedures otherwise approved by the signatory. The
Government asserted:
the Evidence Convention deals comprehensively with the methods availa-
ble to United States courts and litigants to obtain proceedings abroad for
taking evidence. . . . The parties to the Convention contemplated that
proceedings not authorized by the Convention would not be permitted.
The Convention accordingly must be interpreted to preclude an evidence
taking proceeding in the territory of a foreign state party if the Convention
does not authorize it and the host country does not otherwise permit it.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Falzon, 464
U.S. 811 (1983) (No. 82-1888), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 412, 414-15 (1983). Ten
months after filing its brief in Falzon, the United States Government filed an amicus
brief in Club Mediterranee, S.A. v. Dorin, 465 U.S. 1019 (1984). In Club Med, the
defendant, a French national, sought review of an order by a New York state court that
it answer interrogatories pursuant to state law. The issue, as defined by the Govern-
ment, was whether the state court was required to utilize Convention procedures
"where the party asserts that the information necessary to answer the interrogatories is
available only in the territory of a foreign state that is a party to the Convention." Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Club Mediterranee, S.A. v. Dorin, 465 U.S.
1019 (1984) (No. 83-461), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1332 (1984). The Government took
the position that the Convention was not the exclusive means of taking evidence in such
circumstances. In a footnote, the Government sought to reconcile its position in Club
Med with the position it asserted in Falzon.
The trial court in Falzon ordered that employees of a foreign corporation
be deposed in Germany before an American consular officer. Under estab-
lished principles of both domestic and international law, however, Ameri-
can courts are precluded from ordering anyone to participate in discovery
proceedings in the territory of a foreign state absent that state's consent,
wholly independent of the Evidence Convention. Because Germany's con-




tinguished "information-gathering activities" from "evidence-taking
proceedings."' 77 Extraterritorial evidence-taking proceedings violate the
territorial integrity of the foreign signatory and implicate the same con-
cerns of judicial sovereignty that led to negotiation of the Hague Evi-
dence Convention.' Several cases suggest that these concerns are not
raised by mere extraterritorial information-gathering activity. 7 9 Thus,
even after Aerospatiale, it appears likely that, if a deposition or an on-
site inspection is to be conducted in the territory of a foreign signatory,
United States courts will feel themselves obliged to order the parties to
use the Hague Evidence Convention.
The location of an on-site inspection is beyond the power of a
court to change and, therefore, the court and parties cannot avoid the
mandate of the Hague Evidence Convention by simply relocating the
evidence-taking proceeding. When the court has in personam jurisdic-
tion 8 0 over the party on whom a notice of deposition is served, how-
the court in Falzon could order such proceedings in Germany only if au-
thorized by the Convention.
Id. at 1338 n.10. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in Club Med, for lack of
jurisdiction. Club Med, 469 U.S. 913 (1984). Perhaps because the above-quoted lan-
guage represented the full extent of the Government's efforts to reconcile its positions in
the two cases, some commentators concluded that the Government had changed its posi-
tion in the interim. See, e.g., Maier, supra note 50, at 249 ("An interagency squabble
over the position to be taken in the Club Med brief . . . resulted in a substantial
modification of the position taken in the Falzon brief."); Comment, supra note 116, at
281 ("The views expressed in these briefs . . . are inconsistent."); see also infra note
177 (discussing distinction between "information gathering activities" and "evidence-
taking proceedings").
17 This distinction, properly understood, makes entirely consistent the views of
the United States Government expressed in Falzon and Club Med. The Club Med
defendant was ordered to answer interrogatories that allegedly required the gathering
of information that was located in the territory of a foreign signatory and necessary to
answer interrogatories served in the United States. Although this information-gathering
was to be conducted under the compulsion of a United States court, the activity actually
undertaken in the foreign signatory's territory was private. Club Med, 469 U.S. 913. In
Falzon, however, the court's order, if effectuated, would have resulted in an actual
proceeding, conducted by a United States official, taking place within the territory of a
foreign signatory. Falzon, 464 U.S. 811.
178 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
179 See, e.g., In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. granted &judg. vacated sub nom. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH
v. Walker, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987); In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 611
(5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted &judg. vacated sub nom. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v.
Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987); Slauenwhite v. Bekum Mas-
chenfabriken, GmbH, 104 F.R.D. 616 (D. Mass. 1985); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc.,
101 F.R.D. 503, 521, 522 (N.D. Ill. 1984). But see infra notes 240-46 and accompany-
ing text.
180 Defined as the power which a court has over an individual in contrast to a
court's power over an individual's interest in property or over the property itself.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979). For an analysis of international juris-
dictional principles, see Comment, The Extraterritorial Assertion of Long-Arm Juris-
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ever, it has the power to order that the proceeding be conducted outside
the territory of a foreign signatory and thus to avoid mandatory use of
Convention procedures."' 1 Although that power can be exercised to or-
der that the deposition be conducted in the territory of a non-signatory
to the Convention,182 the more commonly employed alternative to the
taking of a deposition in the territory of a foreign signatory is the tak-
ing of a deposition within the United States. 83
diction and the Impact on the International Commercial Community: A Comment and
Suggested Approach, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. LAW 713 (1987). See also Weintraub,
Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Down the Tubes, 23 TEx. J. INT'L L. 53 (criticism
of Asahi Metals Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, which is the most recent Supreme
Court pronouncement on in personam jurisdiction in an international framework).
181 The fact that the evidence-taking proceeding is located outside the territory of
a foreign signatory does not mean that the Convention is inapplicable. It simply means
that it does not provide exclusive jurisdiction. See infra section 5.3.
182 Where depositions in the territory of non-signatories are ordered, they are gov-
erned by Rule 28(b). See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text. The deposing
party will normally prefer either the notice or the commission procedure to the letters
rogatory procedure. Two factors however may prevent use of the former procedures.
First, notice and commission procedures require a willing deponent. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 28(b) advisory committee's note (1963). Second, many countries either restrict or
forbid the use of notice and commission procedures inside their territory. Among na-
tions that forbid notice and commission procedures of the type authorized by Rule
28(b) are Switzerland and Venezuela. Among those that restrict such procedures are
Austria, Korea, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
most Central and South American nations. See, Note, Taking Evidence Outside of the
United States, 55 B.U.L. REv. 368, 374-75 (1975).
Use of letters rogatory may avoid these problems. However, there are still several
nations that will not compel a witness to appear and testify in response to letters roga-
tory. While the majority of nations will compel the presence of a witness at an exami-
nation made pursuant to a letter rogatory, a few will not do so unless there is a treaty
so requiring. Where a foreign national refuses its coercive power in aid of a letter
rogatory, it may be impossible to accomplish the taking of a deposition in that territory.
When the deponent is a party, a court in the United States will have recourse to sanc-
tions against that person if the failure to accomplish the taking of a deposition in a non-
signatory is entirely due to the recalcitrance of that party. See discussion infra at note
266. Furthermore, the procedure can be extremely time-consuming, and will normally
require between three and six months to complete. 4 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GRO-
THEER, JR., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 33, T 28.08, at 28-39. It also
can be costly. See Comment, supra note 21, at 1241, 1242.
Although the letters rogatory procedure is conducted in accordance with the laws
of the foreign country, the evidence obtained by this method must be taken in such a
manner as to make it admissable in the domestic court. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) advisory
committee's note (1963) (citing United States v. Paraffin Wax, 23 F.R.D. 289
(E.D.N.Y. 1959)). Both the manner in which the evidence is taken and the manner in
which it is reported may be troublesome in this regard. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) advisory
committee's note (1963). The 1963 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure liberalized the standards of admissibility of evidence obtained under Rule 28(b),
but district court judges retain discretion with regard to the weight given this evidence.
Id.
183 Illustrative of the use of this alternative is In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm,
GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted &judg. vacated sub nom. Mes-




When depositions of parties are to be conducted in the United
States, the normal deposition rules under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are available, and normally are preferred by the deposing
party."8 4 Depositions in federal civil litigation are governed by Rules
27, 30, 31 and 32 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 30(a)
provides that depositions may be taken by the plaintiff without leave of
court thirty days or more after service of the summons and com-
plaint. 8 The defendant may schedule a deposition at any time after
receipt of the summons and complaint.1 8  Rule 30(b) provides that the
attorney has the right to schedule the time for the deposition. 7 Thus,
a litigant desiring to depose a party or a party's expert witnesses 88
may seek to do so unilaterally under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. If the party is recalcitrant, the normal sanctions under Federal
Rule 37 may be sought. 8 ' At least one court has suggested that the
alternatives 9 . available to a court having in personam jurisdiction over
the district court had ordered defendant, a West German national, to produce for depo-
sitions in the United States persons defendant intended to call as expert witnesses at
trial. Because those persons were German employees residing in Germany, defendant
asserted that discovery must be pursued through Convention procedures. The Fifth
Circuit disagreed. Id. at 731. In rejecting defendant's assertion and upholding the dis-
trict court order, the Court of Appeals noted that the order "might concern Germany,
but it does not involve alien procedures on German soil, is directed to the party-defend-
ant and not the foreign witnesses, and is enforceable only by procedures and sanctions
directed to a party to the litigation in the forum court." Id. at 733.
The court noted that the district court's order could be viewed as a "complement
to the measures for trial preparation expressly sanctioned by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4)." Id. That section provides:
Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held
by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision
(b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or
for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to
identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected
to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the
expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opin-
ion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by other
means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such provisions, pursu-
ant to subsection (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as
the court may deem appropriate.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
18 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
185 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a). Prior to the 30-day period, leave must be given by the
court except in limited circumstances, as where the defendant has noticed a deposition
or otherwise sought discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1).
186 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
187 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
'1 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
1s9 FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
11* Specifically, the option to order that the deposition be taken in a non-signatory
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the person to whom the notice of deposition is directed may motivate
the deponent to consent to deposition in his own country through au-
thorized procedures under the Convention which do not directly involve
the foreign signatory.' 9 ' It may be tempting to believe that the rela-
tively burdensome letter of request procedure can be avoided in favor of
the commission or officer procedure if the party indicates a willingness
to be deposed. This approach fails, however, to take account of the fact
that, under the Convention, the availability of such procedures does not
lie solely in the discretion of the deponent.
The Convention gives separate treatment to those deponents who
are nationals of the requesting state. For example, where the deposition
of a United States national is sought in the course of litigation in the
United States, the Convention assumes that signatories will authorize
the taking of evidence by United States diplomatic officers, consular
agents, or commissioners if the deponent is willing to be deposed. 92
The Convention expressly provides signatories with the right, however;
to require prior, individual permission in such cases.193 Where the de-
ponent is not a national of the forum nation, the Convention recognizes
a different assumption. In this more common case, the Convention pro-
vides that the permission of the signatory is required, unless it has de-
clared otherwise.19 4 Although the United States has made such a decla-
ration,' 95 only four of the other eighteen signatories have done so.'
Thus, the letter of request procedure remains the primary and often
sole means of proceeding under the Convention.
The Convention's recognition of a signatory's right to restrict the
use of voluntary methods of evidence-taking in its territory strongly
suggests that this conclusion applies even where the deponent agrees to
be deposed in a foreign signatory's territory through means not author-
ized by the Convention. 9 The United States Government has taken
nation or in the United States. See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
... Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 521 n.24 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("It
may be that a person to be deposed could avoid the inconvenience of travel to another
country by electing voluntarily to appear before a commissioner or diplomatic or consu-
lar official under Chapter II of the Convention.").
19' Convention, supra note 2, art. 15, 23 U.S.T. at 2564, 847 U.N.T.S. at 244.
192 Id.; see supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
194 Convention, supra note 2, art. 16, 23 U.S.T. at 2564-65, 847 U.N.T.S. at 244.
195 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (1982).
"9 Finland and the Netherlands have made express Article 16 declarations.
Czechoslovakia and the United Kingdom grant permission if there is reciprocity. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1987).
1 See supra notes 72-101 and accompanying text.
198 The situation where a witness volunteers to be deposed in the territory of a
signatory might arise where he is not adverse to being deposed but does not wish to




the position that Convention procedures are exclusive as to both volun-
tary and compulsory depositions conducted within the territory of a for-
eign signatory.' 99 Several United States courts have suggested that the
Convention provides exclusive procedures only for involuntary deposi-
tions.200 To the extent, however, that a rule of exclusivity arises out of
concerns regarding judicial sovereignty over proceedings within a sover-
eign's territory, similar concerns also exist where the deponent volunta-
rily agrees to provide evidence.2 1
Analysis of the first step, identification of the situs of evidence-
taking proceedings, permits the following conclusions: if it is deter-
mined that an evidence-taking proceeding, is to be conducted within the
territory of a foreign signatory, no choice-of-law issue is presented be-
tween the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague Evidence
Convention. In this instance, the Convention provides the exclusive
means by which the proceeding may be conducted, 02 the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are inapplicable, and no further steps need be con-
sidered under this model.203 A determination that an evidence-taking
proceeding is not to be conducted in a foreign signatory's territory does
not render the Convention inapplicable, but instead requires considera-
"' See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Volkswagenwerk A.G. v.
Falzon, supra note 176, at 415.
200 See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. granted &judg. vacated sub nom. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River
Bridge Authority, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987) ("We hold that the Hague Convention is to
be employed with the involuntary deposition of a party conducted in a foreign
country.").
201 This conclusion is supported by the language of the Convention itself, which
gives signatories considerable control over the availability within their territory of depo-
sitions of willing witnesses by foreign officials, the failure of most signatories to grant
general authorization for such depositions, and the limitations placed on the commis-
sion and notice procedures under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b) by many non-
signatory countries. See supra notes 123-31 & note 182 and accompanying text.
202 This conclusion does not necessarily mandate use of the often time-consuming
and expensive letters of request procedure. Article 27 of the Convention provides:
The provisions of the present Convention shall not prevent a Contracting
State from -
(b) permitting, by internal law or practice, any act provided for in this
Convention to be performed upon less restrictive conditions;
(c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence
other than those provided for in this Convention.
Convention, supra note 2, art. 27, 23 U.S.T. at 2569, 847 U.N.T.S. at 246. Therefore,
an evidence-taking proceeding in the territory of a non-signatory must be conducted
either through Convention procedures or through internal practices of the foreign sig-
natory if the foreign signatory permits use of such practices.
103 The natural consequence of this conclusion is that Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 28(b) and 29 serve absolutely no function as to Signatories to the Hague Evi-
dence Convention.
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tion of the second step of the proposed analysis.
5.2. Identiffing the Situs of the Evidence
Although there is limited authority to the contrary, 0 4 the weight
of case law holds that "the Hague Convention does not apply at all to
the discovery of evidence available in the United States."205 The most
thorough discussion of the rationale for this conclusion, based on both
the language and purpose of the Convention itself, is found in Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee.2 °6 In Krishna Con-
sciousness, one of the defendants, a German national, argued that by
virtue of the Convention, "discovery against a party defendant may not
proceed under the ordinary federal rules of discovery if the defendant is
a foreign national . . . regardless of whether the information sought to
be discovered is available in the United States or must be obtained from
a foreign country."2 "" The court rejected this broad interpretation of
the Convention's scope,208 and noted that "[n]o authority has been sug-
gested for the notion that letters of request were ever used or required
to be used to enable litigants to obtain information within the very
country in which they are litigating."209
Thus, where the physical evidence or information sought is pre-
sent in the United States,210 the party seeking such material should
proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 1 If the party
seeking discovery of such material is unsure of its location, it is nor-
204 Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 39 Fed. R. Serv.2d (Callaghan) 211
(N.D. Ill. 1983); Pierburg, GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d
238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982).
205 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435,
444 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also, General Elec. Co. v. North Star Int'l, Inc., 39 Fed. R.
Serv.2d (Callaghan) 207, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin &
Co., S.A., 98 F.R.D. 442, 444 (D. Del. 1982); Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines,
108 A.D.2d 393, 396, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (1985).
208 Krishna Consciousness, 105 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
207 Id. at 437.
208 Id. at 444.
209 Id. at 443.
20 This second step presupposes that the evidence-taking proceeding is to be con-
ducted in the United States rather than in the territory of a foreign signatory. See
supra notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
21. This kind of physical evidence or information normally is sought through Rule
34, which governs "Production of Documents and Things and Entry Upon Land for
Inspection and Other Purposes." FED. R. Civ. P. 34. See also, FED. R. Civ. P. 35
(Physical and Mental Examination of Persons) and FED. R. Civ. P. 36 (Requests for
Admissions). In a footnote in Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court mentioned that plain-
tiffs had made certain requests for the production of documents under rule 34 and for
admissions under rule 36. "Apparently the petitioners responded to those requests
without objection, at least insofar as they called for material or information that was




mally to his advantage to proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and leave to the other party the option of moving for a pro-
tective order under rule 26(c).212 Normally, the burden of showing
good cause for such an order lies with the person seeking it.213 As a
result, when a party objects to the use of discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that the information is located
outside the United States, that party will have the burden of establish-
ing its location.2"'
The same conclusions follow where discovery of knowledge or in-
formation, as opposed to physical evidence, is sought. Where such evi-
dence is sought through interrogatories,"' the party on whom the inter-
rogatories are served will have the burden of showing that they cannot
be answered without resort to evidence or information available only in
the territory of a foreign signatory.216 The same burden would fall
upon a party who was given notice for a deposition to be conducted in
the United States.
The following conclusions are appropriate as a result of the second
step in the proposed model: where the party opposing discovery fails to
show that the evidence or information sought is located in the territory
of a Signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention, the Convention is
inapplicable and discovery should proceed under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.217 Where a party successfully establishes that the evi-
dence or information is located in the territory of a foreign signatory,
however, the court is not compelled to resort to Convention procedures.
Instead, the court should analyze whether deferring to Convention pro-
cedures is appropriate under the choice-of-law methodology discussed
below.21
5.3. Defining The Role of the Hague Evidence Convention When Ev-
idence Located in the Territory of a Foreign Signatory is Sought in
Connection with an Evidence-Taking Proceeding Located in the
United States
Because the Hague Evidence Convention is the exclusive means of
conducting an evidence-taking proceeding in the territory of a foreign
212 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). For the text of this rule, see supra note 135.
.1. See, e.g., U.S. v. Exxon Corp., 94 F.R.D. 250 (D.D.C. 1981).
214 See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 105
F.R.D. 435, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Wilson v. Lufthansa German Nat'l Airlines, 108
A.D.2d 393, 396, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (1985).
215 FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (Interrogatories to Parties).
216 See Krishna Consciousness, 105 F.R.D. at 442.
217 See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
218 See infra section 5.3.
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signatory, 19 and is inapplicable where both the evidence-taking pro-
ceeding and the evidence are located in the United States,220 the only
context in which United States courts and litigants will be presented
with troubling questions regarding the role of the Convention is when
evidence located in the territory of a foreign signatory is sought in con-
nection with evidence-taking proceedings located in the United
States. 2 ' The United States Supreme Court has held that the Hague
Evidence Convention in this context is neither exclusive nor inapplica-
ble.222 The Court, however, declining to offer all but the most general
guidance as to how a United States court is to determine when resort to
Convention procedures is appropriate,223 stated only that "American
courts should . . . take care to demonstrate due respect for any special
problem confronted by the foreign litigant on account of its nationality
or the location of its operations, and for any sovereign interest ex-
pressed by a foreign state. "224
A reasoned choice between the Hague Evidence Convention and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which puts in proper perspective
the interests of the foreign signatory, the United States and the liti-
gants, is more likely to be made if three basic inquiries are resolved.
First, what are the sovereign interests that underlie the foreign signa-
tory's objection to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and to what extent are those interests accommodated by resort to the
Convention? Second, what are the sovereign interests of the United
States in allowing discovery through the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and to what extent are those interests impaired by resort to Con-
vention procedures? Third, will ordering compliance with Convention
219 See supra notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 204-17 and accompanying text.
" Most of the cases preceding Aerospatiale, and the case itself, raised questions
regarding the role of the Convention in exactly this context. See, e.g., Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987); In re Mes-
serschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted &
judg. vacated sub nom. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH v. Walker, 107 S. Ct.
3223 (1987); In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
granted & judg. vacated sub nom. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River
Bridge Auth., 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Compagnie Francaise D'Assurance Pour
Le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co., 102 F.R.D. 956 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Graco,
Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG
Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Ameri-
can Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Lasky v. Continental Prod. Corp.,
569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
22 Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2548, 2554 (1987).





procedures impose a substantial burden on the party seeking discovery
through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and will that burden be
greater than the burden on the other party if discovery is allowed to
proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?225
5.3.1. Evaluating Whether the Foreign Signatory's Sovereign Interests
Can Be Accommodated by Resort to Convention Procedures
In the context of defining the appropriate role for the Hague Evidence
Convention, international comity,226 which is "largely a function of rel-
ative interests as between overlapping jurisdictions,' 221 7 requires a "par-
ticularized analysis of the respective interests of the foreign nation and
225 In many respects the choice-of-law analysis proposed here, and the general
guidelines endorsed by the Court in Aerospatiale, parallel the choice-of-law rules ar-
ticulated by Professor Brainard Currie in the late 1950's for use in domestic conflicts of
law cases. See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DUKE L.J. 171. Professor Currie, the architect of what is widely known as "interest
analysis," posited that a reasoned choice of law could flow only from an evaluation of
the legitimate interests of the states whose laws presented the choice. An "interest"
exists when a policy underlying a law will be advanced by the application of that law
in a particular case. If only one state has such an interest, a "false conflict" exists and
that state's law should be applied. If both states have an interest, a "true conflict"
exists. In what is perhaps the most controversial aspect of Currie's model, he proposed
that a court faced with a true conflict should apply its own law rather than seeking to
weigh the two to determine which is the more worthy. Id. at 178. A determination of
relative worthiness is a "political function of a very high order. . . [that] should not be
committed to courts in a democracy." Id. at 176. Where neither state has an interest,
the case is "unprovided for" and, in Currie's opinion, the choice normally should be
resolved in favor of forum law. Id. at 179.
226 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sov-
ereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law
of one nation . . . shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of
another nation, depends upon what our greatest jurists have been content
to call "the comity of nations . .. .
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obliga-
tion, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Id. at 163-64, quoted in Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555 n.27. A number of commen-
tators have likened comity to a transnational golden rule. Maier, supra note 50, at 253
("Employing the comity concept merely calls into play the fundamentally pragmatic
principle that nations need to treat each other as they themselves would be treated in
the same or similar circumstances."); Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, Two Cheers for the ALI
Restatement's Provisions on Foreign Discovery, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1075,
1100 (1984) ("Do unto other states as you would have them do unto us.")
"22 Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 363 (D. Vt.
1984).
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the requesting nation . ,,22' The choice-of-law model proposed
here initially examines the interests of the foreign signatory and asks
whether those interests can be accommodated by resort to Convention
procedures in the particular case." 9
Although lower courts have tended to give a narrow definition to
the kinds of foreign sovereign interests implicated by discovery under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 the United States Supreme
228 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S.
Ct. 2542, 2555 (1987).
2'9 Before examining the nature of the sovereign interests potentially possessed by
a foreign signatory urging resort to Convention procedures, it is important to note that,
while the interests of the forum, here the United States, in having its procedural laws
applied is presumed, either the party seeking resort to the Convention procedures, or
the foreign signatory in whose territory the evidence is located, must assert the foreign
signatory's interest. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 105
F.R.D. 435, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Murphy, 101 F.R.D. at 361; Sadoff, The Hague
Evidence Convention: Problems at Home of Obtaining Foreign Evidence, 20 INT'L
LAW. 659, 664 (1986) ("[o]f course where both parties to the litigation and the foreign
witness all agree to direct discovery, no issue of the use of the Evidence Convention is
raised and such discovery will not be barred. This is not because there is no intrusion
on the judicial sovereignty of the host country, but rather because no issue will be
presented to the court."). More specifically, this party or signatory must show, initially,
that employing the discovery procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather
than those of the Convention will result in a violation of either an internal law or an
express policy of the signatory. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v.
Lee, 105 F.R.D. at 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting Hague Evidence Convention, art. 9,
23 U.S.T. at 2557, 847 U.N.T.S. at 241); Lasky v. Continental Prod. Corp., 569 F.
Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
The party or signatory additionally must show that the signatory consistently en-
forces that law or articulates that policy. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2556 n.29 ("[tihe
blocking statute thus is relevant to the court's particularized comity analysis only to the
extent that its terms and its enforcement identify the nature of the sovereign interest in
nondisclosure of specific kinds of material." (emphasis added)). If the specific interest
asserted as promoting the propriety of resort to Convention procedures is one which has
not in fact been consistently pursued by the foreign Sovereign, that interest should be
dismissed as irrelevant to the issue, and absent a compelling reason grounded in some
other interest to order otherwise, discovery should proceed pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The focus here is on the actions of the signatory, not on the actions of the party
who asserts the signatory's interest. It is clear that the failure of a party to raise the
issue cannot waive the signatory's interest in having discovery proceed under the Con-
vention. "The failure of one litigant . . . to demand compliance with the [Clonvention
cannot divest the foreign nation of its sovereign judicial rights under the [Clonvention.
The [C]onvention may be waived only by the nation whose judicial sovereignty would
thereby be infringed upon." Pierburg, GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal.
App.3d 238, 244-45, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881 (1982).
We do not suggest here that the failure of a signatory consistently to enforce its
law operates to waive any right it may have to urge Convention procedures upon
American courts. Rather, we suggest that the failure undermines the sovereign interest
that might otherwise lend weight to the signatory's position.
220 A number of courts appear to have taken the position that so long as evidence-
taking proceedings, which by their nature implicate the territorial integrity of the sig-




Court has adopted an expansive interpretation of relevant sovereign in-
terests in this context. The Court has directed lower courts to demon-
strate due respect for "any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign
state."23 Noting in its amicus brief in Aerospatiale that the "precise
nature of the foreign interests at stake in discovery controversies has not
been well articulated by the courts or by foreign litigants in the
past,"2 ' the United States Government identified three broad interests
that either individually or collectively might support an assertion that a
foreign signatory's judicial sovereignty would be violated by a failure to
employ Convention procedures.2"' First, the assertion may "incorporate
legitimate notions of territorial integrity - a reluctance to permit for-
eign litigants to invade one's borders, literally or figuratively, for the
purpose of seizing evidence."'23 Second, the assertion may reflect the
that its judicial sovereignty is being infringed upon is to be either discounted or disre-
garded. See, e.g., Krishna Consciousness, 105 F.R.D. at 447 & n.20 ("In this case
plaintiff seeks production of documents by Lufthansa in New York City. Such produc-
tion would not take place in the Federal Republic of Germany and thus-in contrast,
for example, to the conducting of a deposition or an inspection in Germany - could
not reasonably be deemed to invade that country's judicial sovereignty. . . .Even if [a
German policy against disclosure] existed, disclosure in the United States would not
impinge on Germany's judicial sovereignty, which involves the responsibility for judi-
cial and litigative proceedings in Germany."); General Elec. Co. v. North Star Int'l,
Inc., 39 Fed. R. Serv.2d (Callaghan) 207, 210 (N.D. Il1. 1984) ("A nation's judicial
sovereignty is only threatened . . . when discovery would take place within its bor-
ders."); cf. In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH, 757 F.2d 729, 732 (5th Cir.
1985), ("Discovery, under the Federal Rules, of documents located in Germany need
not directly involve German judicial officers; but Germany is legitimately concerned
• ..lest documents within its borders and owned by its nationals be disclosed in for-
eign procedures."), cert. granted & judg. vacated sub nom. Messerschmitt Bolkow
Blohm, GmbH v. Walker, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987).
2I Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557. This language should not be read to require
a communication by the signatory to the court. The Supreme Court has made clear
that, while the policy or law must be one which the signatory itself has consistently
enforced or advanced, the existence of that law or policy may be communicated to the
United States court by the party seeking resort to Convention procedures. Id. at 2556
("The exact line between reasonableness and unreasonableness in each case must be
drawn by the trial court, based on its knowledge of the case and of the claims and
interests of the parties and the governments whose statutes and policies they in-
voke."(emphasis added)).
232 Brief for the United States and the Securities Exchange Commission as Amici
Curiae, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S.
Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1504, 1515 (1986) [hereinafter
U.S. Amici Brief Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale].
2" The United States Supreme Court, having cited the Government's brief on
another point, noted that "the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Govern-
ment agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great
weight." Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2551 n.19 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.
v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)). See also, O'Connor v. United States, 107
S. Ct. 347 (1986).
"" U.S. Amici Brief Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, supra note 232,
at 1515.
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objection of the civil law nations, "[where] evidence-gathering is usually
conducted by judicial officers rather than by private parties." ' 8 Fi-
nally, the assertion "may simply illustrate a foreign nation's desire to
protect its nationals from liability, or reflect a preference for its own
mode of dispute resolution instead of ours."2 8
The first objection to intrusion on judicial sovereignty, which ad-
dresses an anticipated violation of territorial integrity, is clearly the
most compelling. This conclusion is evidenced by the fact that the right
to conduct discovery proceedings - specifically, depositions and on-site
inspections - in the territory of a foreign signatory cannot be arro-
gated by the United States through the enactment of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 3 7 Such sovereign interests clearly are accommo-
dated by resort to the Hague Evidence Convention because its proce-
dures place the evidence-taking proceeding either in the hands of the
signatory in whose territory the proceeding is to take place," 8 or within
the control of a private commissioner or an official of the requesting
State with the express or implied consent of the signatory.2"9
The second category of sovereign interests, those which arise from
the civil law nations' view of evidence-gathering as a public function,
should also be recognized in deciding whether resort should be made to
Convention procedures. When a party or foreign signatory asserts that,
as a matter of law or policy, ' ° evidence within its borders must be
gathered through its public institutions, a United States court must rec-
ognize that interest in a comity analysis.241 France
42 and Germany,2 43
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 See supra notes 174-204 and accompanying text.
I'll Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. at 2557, 847 U.N.T.S. at 241.
The Special Commission created to draft the Convention noted,
[t]he task of the Commission was merely to 'improve' the existing practice,
particularly in the areas of transmission, reduction of fqrmalities, the lan-
guage and translation problems, the privileges and immunities of witnesses
and the form of the execution of the letters. No basic questions of legal
philosophy and governmental concepts of sovereignty were presented
... .The letter of request ...poses no [judicial sovereignty] question,
because it is performed by the judge or his nominee in the State of
execution.
Rogers, supra note 10, at 447 (quoting Report of the Special Commission, IV Confr-
ence de la Haye de Droit international priv6, AcrEs Er DOCUMENTS DE LA ONZIEME
SESSION, 56 (1978)).
"' Convention, supra note 2, arts. 15-17, 23 U.S.T. at 2564-65, 847 U.N.T.S. at
244. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 229.
2"1 The minority in Aerospatiale clearly rejected any suggestion that judicial sov-
ereignty of this nature was less worthy than judicial sovereignty involving territorial




signatories to the Convention, as well as Switzerland,2 44 a non-signa-
tory, have clearly articulated to the United States their position that
private evidence-gathering in their territory violates judicial sover-
eignty. The United Kingdom has urged the United States to recognize
such sovereign interests in a comity analysis.2 45 Resorting to the proce-
dures under the Convention clearly accommodates these interests inas-
much as use of its procedures, as opposed to those under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, normally will place evidence-gathering in
public hands.248
The third category of objection, one based on a foreign nation's
desire either to protect its nationals or to favor use of its own law, is far
more troublesome. Clearly, the United States Government includes
within this category assertions based upon non-disclosure or "block-
ing"'24 laws enacted by the foreign signatory out of "hostility to Ameri-
can law."'24 These objections, in the Government's view, "should be
approached with some skepticism in any proper comity analysis.
249
Much of the confusion surrounding the relevance of a foreign
blocking statute in deciding whether resort to the Convention is proper
flows from a failure to distinguish between the sovereign interest un-
I am at a loss to understand why gathering documents or information in a
foreign country, even if for ultimate production in the United States, is
any less an imposition on sovereignty than the taking of a deposition when
gathering documents also is regarded as a judicial function in a civil-law
nation.
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. at
2563 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
242 Brief of Amicus Curiae The Republic of France in Support of Petitioners,
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542
(1987) (No. 85-1695), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1519, 1528 (1986).
242 Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae, Societe Nation-
ale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No.
85-1695), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1539, 1546 (1986).
24' Brief of Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct.
2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1550, 1553-54 (1986).
245 Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695), re-
printed in 25 I.L.M. 1557, 1566 (1986).
246 See supra notes 72-74, 134-35 and accompanying text.
2 "The use of the nomenclature 'blocking statute' to describe foreign laws which
purport to qualify, interdict or control disclosure in United States litigation has ob-
tained wide acceptance in recent years and is routinely utilized in the relevant cases."
Batista, supra note 146, at 62 n.1. See generally Societe Nationale Industrielle Aeros-
patiale v. United States Dist Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2546 n.6 (1987) (translation of
French blocking statute).
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derlying the statute, and the extent to which that interest is accommo-
dated by Convention procedures. A blocking statute that is consistently
enforced by a foreign signatory clearly reflects a sovereign interest in
preventing disclosure of information under certain circumstances. 50 If
that interest is not advanced by ordering resort to the Convention, how-
ever, it should be given no recognition in a comity analysis.2"' Thus, if
the foreign blocking law absolutely prohibits the disclosure of particu-
lar records, documents or other information for use in foreign litigation,
and that prohibition is not withdrawn when such evidence is sought
through Convention procedures, 52 the choice of which method to use in
obtaining the evidence is meaningless. By contrast, a blocking statute
that is not violated by discovery through Convention procedures but
that is violated by discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure25 is entitled to recognition in a comity analysis.
More troublesome are blocking statutes that are generally subject
to the signatory's obligations under the Hague Convention, but which
"block" discovery of precisely the kind of information to which a signa-
tory's obligation under the Convention does not extend. Illustrative is a
provision of the French law, prohibiting the communication of docu-
ments or information which may adversely affect the sovereignty, secur-
ity or essential economic interests of France."' This provision is ex-
'50 See generally, Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. at 2557, 847
U.N.T.S. at 241 ("[a] Letter [of Request for Evidence] shall not be used to obtain
evidence which is not intended for use in judicial proceedings, commenced or
contemplated.").
2'5 The conclusion that the existence of such a blocking statute is not entitled to
weight in a comity analysis influencing the choice between the Convention and the
Federal Rules does not mean that the existence of such a statute is irrelevant to a
comity analysis undertaken for other purposes. See infra note 266.
252 Presently, there appear to be no such blocking laws in force in signatory coun-
tries, perhaps because such laws would violate their obligations under the Convention.
See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. This kind of blocking statute, however,
has been enacted by non-signatories. See, e.g., Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Cer-
tain Evidence) Act, 1976 Austl. Acts No. 121 repealed by Foreign Proceedings (Excess
of Jurisdiction) Act 1984 Austl. Acts No. 3; Uranium Information Security Regula-
tions, CAN. CONS. REGS. ch. 366 (1970), amended by Can. Gaz. 3513 (Sept. 12, 1981).
25 Under French law,
Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws and
regulations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose, in
writing, orally or otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or
technical documents or information leading to the constitution of evidence
with a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or in connec-
tion therewith.
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542,
2546 n.6 (1987) (translating, Law No. 80-538, 1980 J.O. 1799, art. 2(11) amending
Law No. 68-678, 1968 J.O. 7267, art ler); see also Protection of Trading Interests Act,
1980, ch. 11 (U.K.).




pressly made subject to France's international treaties and agreements,
which include the Hague Evidence Convention. Under the Convention,
however, France is not obligated to execute a letter of request if it
"considers that its sovereignty or security would be prejudiced
thereby."2 5 As a result, information sought through discovery under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may also be unavailable under the
Convention if disclosure violates a blocking statute. Where a party or
signatory points to such a statute in urging resort to procedures under
the Convention, it should be required to show that the sovereign inter-
est reflected in the statute is accommodated through use of the
Convention.
If it is determined that the sovereign interest threatened by discov-
ery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will not be accommo-
dated by resort to the Hague Evidence Convention, then resort to Con-
vention procedures should not be ordered. Even if it is determined that
a signatory possesses an articulated and consistently asserted interest
that can be accommodated by compliance with Convention procedures,
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not necessarily
improper.256 The soverqign interests of the United States do not simply
disappear in the face of foreign sovereign interests.257
J.O. 7267, art ler. This article was at issue in Compagnie Francaise D'Assurance Pour
Le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
255 Convention, supra note 2, art. 12(b), 23 U.S.T. at 2562, 847 U.N.T.S. at 243.
256 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435,
449 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Compagnie Francaise D'Assurance Pour Le Commerce Exter-
ieur, 105 F.R.D. at 29; Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 510 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
257 Some courts have suggested that decisions reached in earlier Hague Evidence
Convention cases, in seeking to accommodate foreign sovereign interests, gave insuffi-
cient consideration to the interests of the United States.
The solicitude for the judicial sovereignty of civil law countries shown in
Schroeder, Philadelphia Gear, and Pierburg apparently is unmatched by
any recognition that they are suggesting a startling limitation on the sover-
eign powers of this country, as expressed through its courts. Treating the
Convention procedures as exclusive would make foreign authorities the fi-
nal arbiters of what evidence may be taken from their nationals, even
when those nationals are parties properly within the jurisdiction of an
American court.
Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 522 (citing Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp.,
100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1893); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 39 Fed. R.
Serv.2d (Callaghan) 211 (N.D.Ill. 1982); Pierburg, GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Ct.,
137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982)). See also In re Anschuetz & Co.,
GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 612 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted & judg. vacated sub nom.
Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987).
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5.3.2. Determining Whether Substantial Sovereign Interests of the
United States Will Be Impaired by Resort to the Hague Evidence
Convention
If the interests of the foreign signatory can be accommodated
through resort to Convention procedures, the next level of inquiry fo-
cuses on the extent to which substantial interests of the United States
would be impaired if the court were to order compliance with those
procedures. As the United States Government noted in its amicus brief
filed in Aerospatiale,
[t]he central domestic interest is generally the same in any
international discovery dispute. The United States has a fun-
damental obligation to assure that domestic litigants are af-
forded adequate opportunities to adjudicate their claims
... [I]t is well settled that a United States litigant is gen-
erally entitled to adjudicate his claim in accordance with the
laws of the local forum ....
American jurisprudence provides that an important ele-
ment of the litigant's right to judicial access is the opportu-
nity to discover the pertinent facts surrounding his claim.
That element finds explicit recognition in the discovery pro-
visions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Those provi-
sions are central to the conduct of federal judicial
proceedings.258
Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were drafted, in part, to
ensure that "civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried
on in the dark," '259 any civil trial initiated in a United States district
court implicates the interest of the United States in the application of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The question of whether this interest of the United States is suffi-
ciently substantial and seriously impaired by resort to the Hague Evi-
dence Convention is more troublesome. Certainly, to the extent that
Convention procedures are not as likely to produce "just, speedy and
258 U.S. Amici Brief Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, supra note 232,
at 1514-15; see also Compagnie Francaise D'Assurance Pour Le Commerce Exterieur,
105 F.R.D. at 30 ("the United States has a substantial interest in fully and fairly
adjudicating matters before its courts."); Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Mas-
chinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 363 (D. Vt. 1984) ("[t]he United States has a clear
interest in facilitating the manner in which foreign citizens doing business in the
United States are available for litigation here."); In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754
F.2d at 609, (quoting Murphy, 101 F.R.D. at 373).




inexpensive"260 determinations in litigation before federal courts, an in-
terest of the United States is affected. This fact alone, in our opinion, is
not sufficient to show that substantial United States interests are im-
paired. Rather, this second level of inquiry should focus on broader
interests of the United States than those that are present in every suit
filed in federal court. For example, in International Society for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,261 the court found significant the fact
that plaintiff's claims arose out of the First Amendment. "Whatever
may be the ultimate merits of their claims, the paramount importance
of those rights militates against imposing any greater limitations on dis-
covery than are found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure them-
selves." '262 A similar conclusion was reached in Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin,
Inc.:263
The present conflict implicates United States interests of a
Constitutional magnitude. Graco alleges infringement of a
patent held under the United States patent laws, enacted by
Congress under U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8....
The United States patent laws rely heavily for their en-
forcement on private infringement actions by patent holders,
and pre-trial discovery, under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, is an important part of the system of private en-
forcement. This does not mean, of course, that every discov-
ery dispute in a patent case is a Constitutional matter; still,
inadequate discovery frustrates the purposes of the patent
laws and the Constitution.264
Where the substantive claim at issue implicates a strong policy of
the United States, which is grounded either in the Constitution or in
comprehensive statutory regulation, 65 and resort to Hague Convention
procedures will significantly narrow the scope and nature of discovery,
the court should allow discovery to proceed under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 66 Where such interests are not impaired,6 7 resort
260 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
261 105 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
262 Id. at 450.
26 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. II. 1984).
264 Id. at 512-13.
265 See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1149 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
26 The focus of this Article is on the choice of law presented between the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague Evidence Convention. In suggesting that,
when United States interests are impaired by resort to the Hague Evidence Convention,
discovery should be allowed to proceed under the Federal Rules, we do not suggest that
principles of comity are not further relevant to the decision of whether to sanction a
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should be made to the Convention unless the party urging application
party who is not able to comply with a Federal Rules discovery order because of the
existence of a foreign nondisclosure statute. That subject is simply beyond the scope of
this Article. See Rosdeitcher, Foreign Blocking Statutes and U.S. Discovery: A Conflict
of National Policies, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1061 (1984).
267 The extent to which one nation's policies will be impaired by application of
another nation's laws is one of five factors set forth in § 437(1)(c) of the Revised Re-
statement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. RESTATEMENT OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 437(1)(c) (Tent. Draft
No. 7, 1986). In a footnote in Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court mentioned this section
as suggesting "[tihe nature of the concerns that guide [any] comity analysis . .. .
Societe Nationale industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S. Ct. 2542,
2555 n.28 (1987). The factors listed in § 437(1)(c) are:
(1) the importance to the litigation of the documents or other information
requested;
(2) the degree of specificity of the request;
(3) whether the information originated in the United States;
(4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and
(5) the extent to which non-compliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the state where the information is
located.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED)
§ 437(1)(1) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
These factors may be useful in a comity analysis that seeks to inform the choice
between the internal law of one country and the internal law of another country. They
can be, and have been, of use in determining the choice between a rule of the United
States that would allow discovery of particular information and a blocking statute of
another nation that makes criminal the disclosure of that particular information. See
supra note 266. Such factors are of much less value in the kind of comity analysis that
is the focus here. The choice between the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is not a pure choice between competing internal laws of two
nations, but rather is a choice between a law of one nation and a law shared by that
nation and other nations. The discussion below identifies the limited circumstances in
which those factors provide useful guidance in the choice between the Convention and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and indicates that when they do, the three-level
model proposed incorporates such factors.
The relevance of the first factor, the importance to the litigation of the document
or information sought, in the context of the choice between the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Convention, depends on an initial conclusion that the document or
information sought is important. See infra note 287. If the conclusion is reached that
the document is not important to the litigation, the argument of either the party urging
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the party urging the Convention is hardly
advanced. Instead, the conclusion that a document is not important suggests that a court
should grant a motion under Rule 26(c) to exclude altogether the discovery of evidence
located abroad where such discovery is insulting to the foreign signatory and unimpor-
tant to the litigation. See infra notes 291-92 and accompanying text. When the infor-
mation is deemed to be important and complete discovery of the information is shown
to be more likely under the Federal Rules than under the Convention, however, this
fact is relevant to the burden on the party seeking discovery through the Federal Rules,
a concern reflected in the third level of inquiry proposed by the model developed in this
article. See discussion infra note 289.
The relevance of the second factor, the degree of specificity of the request, is de-
pendent on the same kind of analysis. Attempted discovery of broadly or generally de-




of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can demonstrate that compli-
ance with the Convention will impose a substantial burden on that
party which is greater than the burden imposed on the other party if
discovery is allowed to proceed under the Federal Rules.
5.3.3. Evaluating the Burden on the Party Opposing Resort to the
Hague Evidence Convention and Balancing that Burden against the
Burden on the Party Opposing Federal Rules Discovery
The third level of analysis is reached only after it is determined
both that the foreign signatory's sovereign interests are accommodated,
and that substantial interests of the United States are not impaired by
resort to the Convention's procedures. The court in this instance should
order that Convention procedures be used unless the party seeking dis-
covery satisfies the court that such an order would impose a substantial
burden outweighing the one that would be imposed on the other party
if discovery is allowed to proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Convention, supra note 2, art. 23, 23 U.S.T. at 2562-63, 847 U.N.T.S. at 245. See
infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text. The same type of discovery under the Fed-
eral Rules will infringe upon the sovereignty of the foreign signatory in whose territory
the discovery "net" is being cast. The proper response by a court is not to struggle with
the choice between the Federal Rules and the Convention, but instead to refuse to order
compliance with non-specific discovery requests aimed at evidence located abroad.
The third factor, the relevance of the origin of the information in the United
States, is linked to the rule that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the exclu-
sive procedural rules regarding discovery of evidence located in the United States. This
factor recognizes that the sovereign interests of the United States should not be substan-
tially impaired by the simple expedient of removing information originating in the
United States and locating it in the territory of the foreign signatory. Thus, where the
Hague Evidence Convention will not allow as complete access to that information as
the Federal Rules would, the fact that the information originated in the United States
increases the impairment of the United States interest if compliance with Convention
procedures is ordered.
While perhaps useful in other contexts in which a comity analysis is undertaken,
the fourth factor, the unavailability of alternative means of securing the information, is
not particularly useful here. Since the availability of the Hague Evidence Convention
as an alternative means of securing the evidence has been established at an earlier stage
of this analysis, and it is precisely the use of that alternative that one of the parties is
urging, this factor ought, in our opinion, to be ignored in this particular context.
The fifth factor might, analogizing to domestic choice-of-law theories, be labeled a
"comparative impairment" inquiry. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313,
546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976); WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 6.24 (3d ed. 1986). The focus of the second level of the choice-of-law model
proposed here is upon the extent to which United States' sovereign interests are im-
paired by choice of Convention procedures. The first level of analysis requires a dem-
onstration not only that the foreign Sovereign's interests would be impaired by applica-
tion of the Federal Rules but also that the foreign Sovereign's interests would be
accommodated by resort to the Hague Evidence Convention. See supra notes 226-57
and accompanying text.
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Lower federal courts and the Supreme Court have identified three
factors that might impose a burden on the party seeking discovery if
resort to Convention procedures is ordered: time, expense and eviden-
tiary disadvantage."6 8 Time may create a burden on the party seeking
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the effect of the
lengthy nature of the Convention procedures is exacerbated by the
amount of time already spent in the discovery process. 2" An example is
Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik.27 ° In this case, the par-
ties were already approaching the third year of discovery. Noting that
"[alt least one previous letter of request executed in Germany required
many months of effort involving translation of materials, transmittal
through local counsel, review by the German Ministry of Justice and
then by German courts, ' 2 1 the District Court of Vermont refused to
require plaintiff to employ Convention procedures at "this relatively
late stage of discovery .. .., Defendant's delay in arguing for re-
sort to the Convention was not interpreted as an intentional act of bad
faith. In the court's opinion, however, the interests of both the parties
and sound judicial administration suggested that "this case should not
be further prolonged for many months in order to accommodate a
somewhat hypothetical conflict between ordinary American discovery
and German sovereignty. '1271 Similarly, in International Society For
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,274 the District Court of the Southern
District of New York noted that the consequences of the slow pace of
Convention procedures "is enhanced by the pendency of this litigation
for nine years, a delay that led the United States Court of Appeals to
issue an explicit directive . . . to expedite the resolution of the case.
' 275
The mere passage of time should not be viewed as a waiver of the right
to seek resort to Convention procedures. 27 ' Delay is relevant, however,
to measuring the burden it imposes on the party opposing such resort.
The second factor, expense, recognizes that the costs associated
with compliance with Convention procedures-fees for translators, for-
eign legal fees, and transportation expenses-can be "exceedingly
268 See infra notes 270-89 and accompanying text.
269 See infra notes 270-94 and accompanying text.
270 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984).
271 Id. at 361.
272 Id. at 363.
273 Id.
274 105 F.R.D. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
275 Id. at 450.
276 Cf. Slauenwhite v. Bekum Maschinenfabriken, GmbH, 104 F.R.D. 616, 619
(D. Mass. 1985) ("requiring resort to the procedures of the Convention. . .would be





high."2  Although numerous federal cases,"7 ' including Aerospa-
tiale,' 7 9 have mentioned this factor, the mere increase in costs is not
relevant in choosing between the Convention and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure because significant costs will be present in every case in
which resort to the Convention is at issue. Instead, the burden of the
increased cost must be balanced against the benefits gained by resorting
to those procedures; only a burden that substantially outweighs the
benefit is relevant to this level of inquiry.28 ° Such a burden might arise
where a party sought information located in the territory of a foreign
signatory. If the seeking party is required to follow the procedures
under the Convention to discover this information, the significant in-
crease in cost to that party might present a sufficiently substantial bur-
den; in that case, resort to the Convention should not be ordered. Sig-
nificantly, in such a case, the specificity of the request may reduce the
extent to which a foreign signatory's interest in public evidence-gather-
ing is impaired." 1
In the majority of cases in which the role of the Hague Evidence
Convention will be raised, one party, usually the plaintiff, will be a
United States national and the other party will be a national of a for-
eign signatory. The third factor used to assess the burden imposed upon
the party forced to resort to Convention procedures compares the rela-
1' Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
178 In In Re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
granted & judg. vacated sub nom. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River
Bridge Auth. 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987), the United States Court of Appeals declared that,
"[riequiring that such discovery be processed through foreign authorities would work a
drastic and very costly change in the handling of this type of litigation." Id. at 612. See
also International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435, 450
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that "[t]he Hague Convention machinery is quite slow and
costly even when the foreign government agrees to cooperate"); cf. Murphy v.
Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 363 (D. Vt. 1984) (suggesting
that plaintiff would be burdened by late resort to the Convention because of additional
expenses which would be incurred).
179 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S.
Ct. 2542, 2555 (1987).
280 Cf. id. at 2556 ("[t]he exact line between reasonableness and unreasonableness
[of resorting to Convention procedures] in each case must be drawn by the trial court,
based on its knowledge of the case and of the claims and interests of the parties and the
governments whose statutes and policies they invoke.")
1 See supra note 267. The specificity of the request would not reduce the im-
pairment of a foreign signatory's interest reflected in the kind of blocking statute rele-
vant to the choice of law between the Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. Where such a statute exists, the
burden on the party that will be forced to violate it in order to comply with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure discovery may well be greater than the burden of additional
cost imposed on the other party by resort to procedures under the Convention. See infra
notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
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tive access to information available to the party forced to follow the
Convention to that available to the other party who is free to seek dis-
covery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The United States
Supreme Court recognized this "asymmetry" as a reason to reject adop-
tion of a "first resort" rule.2"2
[W]ithin any lawsuit between a national of the United States
and a national of another contracting Party, the foreign
party could obtain discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, while the domestic party would be required
to resort first to the procedures of the Hague Convention.
This imbalance would run counter to the fundamental
maxim of discovery that "[m]utual knowledge of all the rele-
vant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation."2 8
The "unfair evidentiary advantage"2 4 of the party having full re-
sort to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may lead
to the result that the other party, who is subject to the far more limited
procedures under the Convention, will be "unable to prepare its case
against a fully-prepared foreign party. 28 5 Such a situation is most
likely to occur when evidence is located in the territory of a signatory
that has exercised its right under Article 23 of the Convention not to
execute letters of request "issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial
discovery of documents . "... ,,28 This burden is exacerbated when re-
sort to the Convention is likely to be futile in light of an Article 23
declaration 287 or other limitation on discovery through Convention
282 Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2553 (1987).
28 Id. at n.25, (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)).
28 In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH, 757 F.2d 729, 731 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. granted &judg. vacated sub nom. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH
v. Walker, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987).
285 Id. (emphasis added).
288 Convention, supra note 2, art. 23, 23 U.S.T. at 2568, 847 U.N.T.S. at 245.
See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
2987 A number of federal cases have refused to order resort to the Convention on
this ground. For example, in Lasky v. Continental Products Corporation, the court in
refusing to order plaintiff to use Convention procedures, concluded that "imposing the
blanket restriction sought by [defendant] would severely restrict the plaintiff's scope of
discovery [in light of West Germany's Article 23 declaration]." 569 F. Supp. 1227,
1229 (E.D. Pa. 1983). In Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, the court
concluded that "particularly where it appears that a request for production of docu-
ments under the Convention would be futile" in light of West Germany's article 23
declaration, comity did not require the plaintiff, a United States citizen, to proceed first
under the Convention. 101 F.R.D. 360, 363 (D. Vt. 1984). Similarly, in International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, one of three compelling reasons cited as sup-
port for the decision to permit the plaintiffs, United States citizens, to pursue their





Unless the burden on the person who seeks to avoid Convention
procedures is substantial, the court should order that party to resort to
those procedures. A showing of "substantiality" in this context requires
that the information sought be important and material to the resolution
of a key issue in the litigation. 89 Since progress to this level of the
choice-of-law analysis presupposes the existence of a foreign Sover-
respect to the request for documents, a requirement seeking cooperation from the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany would "be an act of futility" in light of its Article 23 decla-
ration. 105 F.R.D. 435, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
28 This kind of burden might arise when the foreign signatory has a significantly
broader scope of privilege than would be available under United States law. Pain v.
United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1128 (1981).
28I A number of comity tests mention the importance of the information sought to
the party seeking it as a relevant factor. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REviSED) § 437(1)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1986); Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204-205 (1958); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.
Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979). In In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, the court, apply-
ing the standards set forth in Societe Internationale v. Rogers, noted, "the normal
discovery standard of whether a document is relevant or is calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence does not apply, and should be replaced by the higher
standard of whether the requested documents are crucial to the resolution of a key issue
in the litigation." 480 F. Supp. at 1146. Other cases appear to have set a somewhat
lower standard of "importance." United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th
Cir.) ("courts have refused to require production where the documents sought are
largely cumulative of records already produced."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981);
Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972). As the court
noted in Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., "[t]hese cases do not suggest . . . that the dis-
covery requests must meet some exceptionally high standard of relevance; these cases
merely indicate that the importance of the documents is a factor to be considered by the
court." Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 515 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
Comment a to § 437 of the Restatement (Revised) briefly discusses the content of
the "importance" factor:
Given the degree of difficulty in obtaining compliance, and the amount of
resistance that has developed in foreign states to discovery demands
originating in the United States, it is ordinarily reasonable to limit foreign
discovery to information necessary to the action (typically, evidence not
otherwise readily obtainable) and directly relevant and material.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED), § 437
comment a, at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986). Reporters' Note No. 2 to this section
states:
[w]hile the proponent of discovery may not know at the beginning of the
discovery process whether a given item of information will turn out to be
directly relevant or material, subsection 1 [of § 437] requires him to per-
suade the court of the likelihood that the request meets a higher standard
than applies in routine domestic cases; if the proponent of discovery cannot
do so at the outset, the discovery request may be renewed at a later stage
in the action.
Id. at 37-38. This language has "proven controversial." U.S. Amid Brief Societe Na-
tionale Industrielle Aerospatiale, supra note 232, at 1514 n.20.
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eign's interest that is accommodated by use of Convention proce-
dures,"' an insubstantial burden on one of the litigants should not ob-
viate resort to the Convention in light of the presence of sovereign
interests.
Even if the interests of that litigant are substantial, however, the
interest of the party seeking discovery under the Convention may be
equally compelling. In evaluating this party's burden, it is important to
distinguish between burdens imposed by discovery generally, and bur-
dens imposed by the choice .to pursue discovery through the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In Aerospatiale, the United States Supreme
Court noted:
American courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings,
should exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants
from the danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome,
discovery may place them in a disadvantageous position. Ju-
dicial supervision of discovery should always seek to mini-
mize its costs and inconvenience and to prevent improper
uses of discovery requests. When it is necessary to seek evi-
dence abroad, however, the District Court must suiervise
pretrial proceedings particularly closely to prevent discovery
abuses.291
These concerns are relevant to the scope of discovery without reference
to the Convention. Unreasonable or intrusive discovery requests should
not be enforced by federal courts through either the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or the Hague Evidence Convention.292
The burden relevant to the comity analysis at this level is the bur-
den that will be imposed on the party opposing discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if Convention procedures are not im-
29 See supra notes 226-57 and accompanying text.
291 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S.
Ct. 2542, 2557 (1987).
292 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). This rule states in pertinent part:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in
subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtaina-
ble from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity
by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the
discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties'
resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The
court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant




plemented. Only the burden created by a blocking statute prohibiting
the disclosure of information through any process other than the Hague
Evidence Convention is relevant here.293 When a party can show both
that discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will force a
violation of a foreign nation's blocking statute, which is likely to be
enforced against it,294 and that disclosure through Convention proce-
dures will not create similar burdens, the other party must demonstrate
that its burden in being required to follow the Convention outweighs
the burden imposed upon the party seeking to avoid discovery under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5.4. Taking Evidence from Non-Party Witnesses
In their argument before the Supreme Court in Aerospatiale, the
appellees asserted that it was "appropriate to construe the Convention
as applying only in the area in which improvement was badly
needed," '95 or, in other words, "to obtain evidence from non-party wit-
nesses abroad. ' 296 In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that "the
text of the Convention draws no distinction between evidence obtained
from third parties and that obtained from the litigants themselves. 297
Despite the absence of any literal distinction in the Convention, how-
ever, several lower federal courts have appeared to draw this distinction
in dicta.298 While the distinction between parties and non-parties may
be relevant in deciding whether a choice between the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Convention is presented,2 99 it is irrelevant, ex-
cept in one instance, in deciding the choice of law between the two
when it is presented.
As is true when evidence is sought from parties, an evidence-tak-
29 See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
9 This requirement is analogous to that imposed on the signatory or party argu-
ing that discovery through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would violate the sov-
ereign interests of the signatory. See supra note 229. It should not suffice that the party
urging use of the Convention raise the existence of a non-disclosure law covering the
information sought through discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That
party should be required to show the likelihood that the law in fact will be enforced
against him if he discloses the information sought.
295 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S.
Ct. 2542, 2554 (1987).
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 See, e.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 607 F. Supp. 324,
326 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Slauenwhite v. Bekum Maschinenfabriken, GmbH, 104 F.R.D.
616, 617-18 (D. Mass. 1985); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 521 (N.D.
Ill. 1984); Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 363 (D.
Vt. 1984).
299 See supra notes 175-218 and accompanying text.
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ing proceeding directed at a non-party witness that is to be conducted
in the territory of a foreign signatory must be conducted through Con-
vention procedures.300 In the case of non-party witnesses who are not
United States nationals or residents, there is no basis of power in either
domestic or international law to compel their presence at proceedings
located elsewhere.301 As a result, the mandatory application of the Con-
vention cannot be avoided by the simple expedient of conducting the
proceeding outside the foreign signatory, unless the witness consents to
travel to the alternate site. If the non-party witness located in the for-
eign signatory is a United States national or resident, the United States
can assert its power to subpoena that witness. 0 2 The language of the
300 See supra notes 175-203 and accompanying text.
301 See supra note 142.
"A subpoena directed to a witness in a foreign country shall issue under the
circumstances and in the manner and be served as provided in Title 28, U.S.C.
§ 1783." FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2). In Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932),
the United States Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the statute form-
ing the basis for § 1783, see Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 762, 44 Stat. 835 §§ 1-3 (repealed
1948) (providing for service of letters rogatory on United States citizens abroad by
United States consuls), and stated that the "mere giving of such a notice [of subpoena]
.. . to the citizen in the foreign country of the requirement of his government that he
shall return is in no sense an invasion of any right of the foreign government." Black-
mer, at 439. Professor Smit's criticism of this conclusion, authored before negotiation of
the Hague Evidence Convention, is even more appropriate in light of the Convention.
The correctness of these statements is clearly subject to serious doubt...
[Tihere seems to be no question that the freedom of the United States
consul to make personal service within the territory of a foreign state is
entirely dependent on the foreign sovereign's willingness to allow such ser-
vice. Not only does the prohibition imposed on United States consuls from
making service abroad except in a number of narrowly circumscribed cases
bear telling witness of official recognition of this fact, but it is undeniable
that a number of foreign sovereigns specifically forbid service by United
States consuls within their territory. Accordingly, reconsideration of the
provision of sections 1783 and 1784 for personal service abroad by United
States consuls would seem appropriate, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's rather lighthearted assumptions.
Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1031,
1046 (1961).
The mere service of a subpoena in a foreign signatory may violate that signatory's
internal law. See supra note 144. Since many of the signatories to the Hague Evidence
Convention are also signatories to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20
U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Conven-
tion], service of a subpoena, even on a United States national, may have to be accom-
plished through means defined by the Hague Service Convention. To date, Barbados,
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
the United Kingdom and the United States are Signatories to both Conventions. TREA-
TIES AFFAIRS STAFF, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREA-
TIES IN FORCE, JANUARY 1, 1987 (1987); see also, OFFICE OF PUBLIC COMMUNICA-




United States law authorizing issuance of the subpoena, however, ap-
pears to require a showing that the information could not otherwise be
obtained through use of the Convention. 03 Where such a showing is
made, the court is empowered to establish the place for the appearance
of the witness or the production of the document. As long as that place
is outside the territory of a foreign signatory, mandatory application of
the Hague Evidence Convention can be avoided.
When the evidence-taking proceeding is to be conducted in the
United States, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the exclu-
sive means of discovery if the evidence is also located in the United
States. °4 As is true when discovery is sought of parties, the only cir-
cumstance in which a choice of law between the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Convention will be presented is when an evidence-
taking proceeding is to be conducted in the United States and the evi-
dence is located in the territory of a foreign signatory. In this latter
case, exactly the same choice-of-law analysis should be undertaken as is
described in Section 5.3.305 Both the interests of the foreign signatory
and the extent to which those interests will be accommodated by resort
to the Convention are likely to be the same as where evidence is sought
from a party.30 6 Since discovery from a non-party witness under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires some basis of jurisdictional
DEP'T OF STATE BULLETIN 67 (Oct. 1987) (for information on Spain's adoption of the
Hague Service Convention).
303 28 U.S.C. § 1783 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A court of the United States may order the issuance of a subpoena
requiring the appearance as a witness before it, or before a person or body
designated by it, of a national or resident of the United States who is in a
foreign country, or requiring the production of a specified document or
other thing by him, if the court finds that particular testimony or the pro-
duction of the document or other thing by him is necessary in the interest
of justice, and . . . if the court finds, in addition, that it is not possible
to obtain the production of the document or other thing in any other
manner.
Id. (emphasis added).
3" It should be noted, however, that the discovery devices available under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially more limited when discovery is
sought of non-parties than when discovery is sought of parties. While the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure governing deposition, FED. R. Civ. P. 27-32, apply to both
parties and non-parties, FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a), 31(a), the rules governing interrogato-
ries, requests for production of documents, and requests for admissions, extend only to
parties. FED. R. Civ. P. 33, 34, 36. Rule 35, governing physical and mental examina-
tions of persons, permits such examinations of a party or "a person in the custody or
under the legal control of a party. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 35. The subpoena power
under rule 45 may be used to compel a person within the court's jurisdictional reach to
give testimony or produce documents.
305 See supra Section 5.3.
300 See supra notes 226-57 and accompanying text.
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power over the witness, the sovereign interests of the United States are
likely to be impaired under similar circumstances as would arise with
parties. 0 7 Similarly, the burden on the party seeking discovery through
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is likely to parallel the burden
that would exist if the same information were sought from the other
party.308 The burden on a non-party witness who would be required to
violate a non-disclosure law if ordered to produce evidence under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but who would not violate that law
through Convention procedures, should be given even greater weight in
the balance proposed 0 9 than the burden similarly imposed on a party
to the litigation. 10
6. CONCLUSION
In his dissenting opinion in Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale,31 Justice Blackmun expressed concern that the major-
ity's failure to provide guidance to lower federal courts would result in
a "pro-forum bias [creeping] into the supposedly neutral balancing pro-
cess and courts not surprisingly often will turn to the more familiar
procedures established by their local rules."3 2
Experience to date indicates that there is a large risk that the
case-by-case comity analysis now to be permitted by the
Court will be performed inadequately and that the some-
what unfamiliar procedures of the Convention will be in-
voked infrequently. I fear the Court's decision means that
courts will resort unnecessarily to issuing discovery orders
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a raw exercise
of their jurisdictional power to the detriment of the United
30I See supra notes 258-67 and accompanying text.
The force of a subpoena for production of documentary evidence generally
reaches all documents under the control of the person or corporation or-
dered to produce, saving questions of privilege and unreasonableness. It
makes no difference that a particular document is kept at a place beyond
the territorial jurisdiction of the court that issues the subpoena. The test is
one of control, not of location.
5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 45.0512], at 45-29 (2d ed.
1987) (footnotes omitted).
38I See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
309 See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
310 For discussion of the significance of this burden in an international discovery
context not involving the Hague Evidence Convention, see Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticom-
modity Serv., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 525-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
"I Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107
S.Ct. 2542, 2557 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).




States' national and international interests.313
In order to avoid such a result, Justice Blackmun would have lower
courts evaluate not only the internal or domestic sovereign interests of
the foreign signatory and the United States but also "the mutual inter-
ests of all nations in a smoothly functioning legal regime" S in making
a choice-of-law decision regarding the Hague Evidence Convention.
The model we propose does not make such "mutual interests" a
discrete choice-of-law inquiry, in part because "[u]se of Hague Con-
vention procedures in lieu of the Federal Rules when discovery is
sought in a civil law country . . . will in nearly every instance promote
'the development of an ordered international system.' "I" We believe
that the analytic approach proposed in this Article places both the sov-
ereign interests of the foreign signatory and the mutual international
interests in proper perspective. Where the interests of the foreign Sov-
ereign are accommodated by resort to the procedures established in the
Convention, federal courts are to order resort to those procedures unless
substantial interests of the United States or of the litigant seeking dis-
covery through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be im-
paired. 16 This choice-of-law method addresses the concern of the ma-
jority in Aerospatiale that courts in the United States "take care to
demonstrate due respect for any special problem confronted by the for-
eign litigant . . . and for any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign
state." 1 ' It also addresses the concern expressed by Justice Blackmun
by both providing a functional model for solving transnational disputes
and "[avoiding] foreign perceptions of unfairness that result when
United States courts show insensitivity to the interests safeguarded by
foreign legal regimes."3'18
313 Id. at 2558.
314 Id. at 2562.
315 Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33, 40 (N.D.N.Y.
1987) (quoting 107 S. Ct. at 2567 (Blackmun, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
316 See supra notes 256-67 and accompanying text.
317 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 107 S.
Ct. 2542, 2557.
311 Id. at 2568. To date, only one post-Aerospatiale case, involving the appropri-
ate role of the Hague Convention, has been decided. In Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter,
GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), plaintiff sued in negligence and strict
liability for injuries she suffered while operating a machine allegedly manufactured by
defendant, a West German corporation. At issue was a set of interrogatories served by
plaintiff upon defendant, seeking detailed information about the design of the machine
and the conduct of defendant's business affairs in the United States. Defendant de-
manded that such information be sought through Convention procedures rather than
through the Federal Rules. The court so ordered.
Noting that a primary difference between the majority and minority opinions in
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Aerospatiale is the weight to be given the individual interests of the parties, the court
determined that the de-emphasis on those interests in Justice Blackmun's minority
opinion was preferred and consequently applied Justice Blackmun's proposed analytic
framework. Id. at 37. The court began by examining the foreign interests implicated by
plaintiff's discovery request. It found the request "offensive to the sovereign interests"
of West Germany. Id.
The diplomatic problems created by the use of discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules within the borders of West Germany which constitute nothing less than a viola-
tion of West Germany's internal laws by outsiders with the approval and support of
United States courts are largely diminished when the procedures of the Hague Conven-
tion are utilized. Though the Convention contemplates the taking of evidence within
West German borders by individuals who are not judicial officers of West Germany,
that nation's consent to the use of Convention procedures reduces the danger of offend-
ing West Germany's sovereign interests . . . [and] weighs heavily in favor of the use of
those procedures in the first instance. Id. at 38.
The court acknowledged that the United States had interests as well, particularly
in assuring fair and equal treatment of litigants before United States courts. It noted,
however, that the greatest obstacle to effective use of Convention procedures to accom-
plish that result lay in lack of familiarity of American courts with those procedures.
Consequently, use of Convention procedures will, at least initially, result in
greater expenditures of time and money for attorneys pursuing causes of action against
foreign parties on behalf of their clients and could require an increased commitment of
judicial resources. Nonetheless, these inconveniences alone do not outweigh the impor-
tant purposes served by the Hague Convention. Further, as judges and lawyers become
more familiar with the discovery rules of the Convention, it is quite possible that its
procedures will prove just as effective and cost-efficient as those of the Federal Rules.
To assume that the "American" rules are superior to those procedures agreed upon by
the signatories of the Hague Convention, would reflect the same parochial biases that
the Convention was designed to overcome. Id. at 38-39.
Additionally, the court noted that if Convention procedures proved unavailing, it
had "extensive discretionary powers to control discovery" that would allow it to compel
discovery through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a method of second resort.
Id. at 39. Finally, the court found that an order that the parties proceed through the
Hague Convention would further the mutual interests of the community of nations in
promoting effective international judicial cooperation. Id. at 39-40.
Although the framework applied by the court in Hudson differs from the analyti-
cal model proposed here, the result reached by application of the two models is the
same. Since the sovereign interests of West Germany clearly are accommodated by or-
dering resort to Hague Evidence Convention procedures, those procedures should be
chosen under our model unless the substantial interests of either the United States or
one of the parties are sufficiently impaired to justify application of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (despite the existence of West Germany's interests). Since Hudson is a
state-created tort action, neither a constitutional nor an extensive statutory policy of the
United States is at issue. As a result, the interests of the United States in applying the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would not be sufficiently substantial to overcome
West Germany's interest in applying the Convention. Although the model chosen by
the Hudson court did not compel it to examine the interests of the parties, there is
nothing in the court's opinion suggesting that the burden on the plaintiff, in being
forced to pursue discovery through the Convention, would be substantial. In fact, the
scope of the discovery sought, involving a minimum of ninety-two interrogatories,
would suggest that any additional cost to the plaintiff could be justified by the scope of
the information potentially obtained.
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